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No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the
New Millennium and the Blurring of
Categorical Imperatives
Linda S. Mullenix
With the recent approval of the proposed amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules and the Judicial Conference of the
United States have taken a major step towards substantially re-
vising the class action rule. Among the federal rules, the class
action rule is unique in that it is one of the few original 1938
rules to have been completely re-written in 1966. Thus, the 2002
amendments reflect the second major substantial overhaul of the
class action rule since 1966.1
Although the rule amendments at first seem like a sweeping
overhaul, in reality the revisions embody the codification of class
action practice over the past thirty-six years.2 Rather than forg-
ing new principles, the class action amendments instead deline-
ate rules and principles that federal appellate courts have articu-
lated in the large body of class action jurisprudence in this pe-
riod.3
Morris and Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, The University of Texas School of Law.
The class action rule was amended in 1998 to add the new subsection (fA authoriz-
ing appellate review of class certification orders. See Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in
Whoville: Rule 23(fA A Good Rulemaking, 69 U Tenn L Rev 97 (2001). The process leading
to this rule amendment was commenced by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in
1991. See David Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee: Perspectives
on Rule 23 Including the Problem of Overlapping Classes (Ap 24, 2002), available online
http://www.lfcj.com/articles/display.asp?artnum=70 (visited Oct 22, 2003). The Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules has studied and made recommendations for amendments to
Rule 23 for more than a decade, and this process will continue even after final approval of
the 2002 Rule 23 amendment package.
2 The 2002 amendments revise certain provisions of Rule 23(c) and 23(e), and add
new subsections Rule 23(g) (appointment of class counsel) and Rule 23(h) (attorney fee
awards). See Levi, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (cited in note 1).
3 See id at 1-3. This is especially true for the new proposed subsections (g) and (h)
relating to the appointment of counsel and the determination of attorneys' fees in class
actions. Subsection (g) relating to appointment of class counsel reflects principles devel-
oped by federal courts over several years, and subsection (h) relating to the determination
of attorneys' fees reflects and codifies principles relating to attorneys' fees extant in fed-
eral class action jurisprudence.
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The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has been able to ac-
complish this current revision of Rule 23 in no small measure by
avoiding controversy.4 During the decade in which the Advisory
Committee has floated various proposals to amend Rule 23 to
deal with pressing issues of class action jurisprudence, the Advi-
sory Committee has consistently retreated in the face of strenu-
ous, vocal criticisms from the bench, bar, and the academy.5
The Advisory Committee has been able to achieve consensus
on Rule 23 revisions only when the Committee proposed "least
common denominator" or "least objectionable" revisions. In es-
sence, any Rule 23 proposals that were innovative or that dealt
with cutting edge class action issues were swiftly banished from
the drafting table or consigned to rule-making limbo.6
Consequently, we now have a Rule 23 revision that codifies
long-established class action principles, that offends no one, and
that does not deal with the truly pressing class action issues that
have developed in the past thirty-six years. The 2002 amend-
ments largely address the appointment of class counsel and the
awarding of attorney fees. Included in the universe of class action
problems most likely to give offense-and therefore least likely to
' The Advisory Committee, since it first began considering revision of Rule 23 in
1991, has retreated from every radical proposal to overhaul the class action rule. In 1992,
the Advisory Committee decided not to completely revise the entire Rule 23 (as it did in
the 1966 revision). After extensive hearings during 1997, the Advisory Committee decided
not to go forward with a proposed new settlement class that would have added a new Rule
23(b)(4) class category for "settlement classes." In the face of extreme controversy, the
Advisory Committee relegated the settlement class proposal to rulemaking limbo after the
Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 527 US 591 (1997),
where this proposal subsequently languished and expired. For the debate surrounding the
proposed settlement class, see Paul D. Carrington and Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitu-
tional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negoti-
ated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 Ariz L Rev 461 (1997); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitu-
tionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 Ariz L Rev 615 (1997).
' The initial round of proposed amendments to Rule 23, during the period between
1991-1997, generated enormous and often heated reaction from the practicing bar. For a
collection of the various draft Rule 23 proposed amendments, as well as the extensive
written and oral commentary on the proposals, see Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (2001), available online at <http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/congress
0303/CV-Redline.pdf> (visited Sept 5, 2003) (Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, four-volume legislative history of the proposed amendments to Rule 23).
' See notes 5-6. See also Levi, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (cited in
note 1). The Advisory Committee identified numerous other problem areas relating to
class action litigation, including problems relating to duplicative, overlapping class ac-
tions. However, after consideration, the Advisory Committee determined not to deal with
these problems through a rule revision. Id.
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be addressed-are problems relating to the mandatory Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes
When the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began its Rule
23 project in 1991, the possibility of wholesale revision of the
mandatory classes was proposed.8 This trial balloon was quickly
deflated and never seriously reconsidered. The major focus of the
Advisory Committee's concerns shifted to revision of other sec-
tions of the rule.9
The current 2002 revision package does include a provision to
provide permissive notice to the mandatory Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes."0 It also includes provisions for a double opt-out op-
tion in Rule 23(b)(3) classes,11 suggesting that the Advisory Com-
mittee believes that opt out rights are important enough to pro-
vide two opportunities for exclusion from damage class actions.
But the permissive band-aid notice relief for mandatory classes
does not address nor resolve the fundamental problems that ad-
here in mandatory classes. The Advisory Committee, consistent
with its political "give no offense" approach to rule revision, has
' The revisions to Rule 23 that have been effected since 1991 do not include any
revisions to Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b). Although the Advisory Committee's first round of
Rule 23 revisions included a proposal to amend Rule 23(b) to add a new Rule 23(b)(4) for
settlement classes, this proposal died in Committee. See note 5. The very first proposals to
amend Rule 23, first floated in 1991, included provisions to amend Rule 23(b), and in-
cluded recommendations to create "opt-in" classes for all the Rule 23(b) categories. See
Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 (cited in note 5). These radi-
cal suggestions were swiftly abandoned after massive negative reaction by interested
commentators to this set of initial trial proposals.
See Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (cited in note 5).
As indicated above, the only revision resulting from the Advisory Committee's
efforts between 1991-97 was the new Rule 23(f) providing for interlocutory review of class
certification orders. See note 3. The only attempt to deal with the Rule 23(b) categories
was the aborted attempt to add a new class category for settlement classes, which effec-
tively was defeated by default. See notes 5 and 8.
" See proposed Rule 23(c)(2) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the
court may direct appropriate notice to the class."), in Levi, Report of the Civil Rules Advi-
sory Committee 96 (cited in note 1). The Advisory Committee originally proposed that
notice be mandatory in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. After publication of the proposed rule for
notice and comment, the Advisory Committee retreated from this mandatory proposal.
Judge Levi's report indicated that "The most important change since publication [of the
proposed amendments] is to modify the proposal that notice be required in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
class actions. Comments from many civil rights groups urged that mandatory notice, even
if by relatively inexpensive means, could cripple many class actions." Id at 2.
" See proposed Rule 23(e)(3) ("In an action previously certified as a class action under
Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new oppor-
tunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to
request exclusion but did not do so."). Levi, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
102 (cited in note 1). The Advisory Committee originally had proposed two alternative
versions for a double opt-out opportunity, and chose the "restyled" second version. Id at
123.
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evaded and avoided grappling with and resolving the major prob-
lems of mandatory classes.
Against this backdrop of rule reform, the various problems of
mandatory classes remain. Mandatory classes will be problematic
until the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Supreme Court,
or Congress steps in and brings order to this universe. As things
now stand, the so-called "Shutts problem" remains unresolved,
the Supreme Court views mandatory classes through a lens re-
fracted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the stra-
tegic deployment of mandatory classes contributes to litigant un-
fairness. Moreover, the strategic possibilities offered by manda-
tory classes encourage gaming the system, with consequent cyni-
cal appreciation of the justice system, on a grand scale.
This Article argues that the concept and use of the manda-
tory class has changed considerably during the last fifty years,
which fact is largely under-appreciated by the Supreme Court.
Thus, the mandatory class in the twenty-first century bears only
remote resemblance to the archetypal illustrations in the Advi-
sory Committee's 1966 Note.1" Nonetheless, as the mandatory
class has evolved, the federal appellate courts have not offered a
coherent structure for explaining and dealing with the mandatory
class, a failure that continues into the twenty-first century.
Moreover, the courts' doctrinal incoherence has blurred the
categorical distinctions among class categories that the Advisory
Committee carefully promulgated in 1966. Therefore the entire
class action rule has been rendered analytically incoherent. It has
become increasingly difficult to distinguish among the 23(b)(1),
(b)(2), and (b)(3) class categories in any meaningful way.
The very vocabulary of class action litigation has, over time,
been debased and distorted to permit litigation results that are
analytically incoherent. Thus, core concepts of homogeneity and
heterogeneity of interests that once were integral to the 23(b)(1),
(b)(2), and (b)(3) classes have been rendered malleable in all but
label. Concepts of "predominance" are used loosely, and often in-
terchangeably, among the mandatory and opt-out classes. The
concept of the "hybrid" class-once a distinct analytical category
under the original 1938 rule-now describes various types of pro-
posed class actions, and has assumed many meanings, depending
on the setting.
" FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendment, Subdivision (b)(1) and
Subdivision (b)(2).
[2003:
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Moreover, while many courts pay lip service to old rhetorical
constructs, decisions often avoid the practical implications of
those categories. Loose labeling, result-oriented accommodations,
creative innovations, and doctrinal incoherence all have contrib-
uted to uncertainties relating to due process and fairness. These
factors also have maximized opportunities for gaming the system;
that is, to obtain strategic litigation advantage through manipu-
lating the rule and class action jurisprudence in ways not con-
templated by the rulemakers or the courts. This Article concludes
by suggesting the Supreme Court, the rulemaking bodies, or
Congress need to bring analytical coherence to the mandatory
classes in the new millennium. These bodies must pursue an ana-
lytically sound appreciation of mandatory classes that ensures
due process protections to all class litigants, and that eliminates
opportunities for the strategic deployment of the mandatory
class. Moreover, we need an explanation of the mandatory class
that makes sense in the overall scheme of the class action rule,
including the Rule 23(b)(3) class.
Part I of this Article canvasses the various discussions that
attempt to conceptualize the problem relating to the right to opt
out of class action lawsuits. In this Part I suggest that commenta-
tors, including the scholars in the University of Chicago Legal
Forum Symposium, view the opt-out problem as one adhering in
the 23(b)(3) damage class only. I suggest that these discussions of
the opt-out question truncate a full consideration of the right to
opt out, which must be viewed in the context of all the class cate-
gories and not only the 23(b)(3) class. Stated differently, I argue
that any consideration of the right to opt out must take into ac-
count the countervailing consideration that the mandatory
classes permit no exit from the class, or no right to opt out.
In Part II, I survey the problems relating opt-outs in the con-
text of the mandatory classes, and the sources of these problems.
In this Part, I briefly canvass the evolution of the mandatory
class since 1966. This Part summarizes the due process under-
pinnings of the class action rule, as the basis for discussing the
serious due process problems that inhere in the mandatory class
categories. Part III canvasses the Supreme Court's continuing
failure to address due process concerns in the mandatory classes,
and how this failure has inspired divergent views among the
lower federal courts. This Part concludes with an analysis of the
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Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp,3 which con-
tains the Court's most recent, yet brief and unenlightening, com-
ments on the due process dimensions of mandatory classes.
Part III also briefly comments on the continuing development
of a theory of mandatory classes in the post-Ortiz era, and traces
the doctrinal split in thinking about due process concerns. One
branch of decisions has developed in relation to Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
mandatory classes (following Ortiz); while a second branch has
developed regarding Rule 23(b)(2) classes that include mixed
forms of relief. In this second cluster of cases, federal courts have
further split, with some following the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Allison v Citgo Petroleum Corp,4 and other courts following the
Seventh Circuit's lead in Jefferson v Ingersoll International, Inc."5
This Part discusses and critiques the emergence of the new con-
cept of the hybrid class action as a consequence of these decisions.
This Part also briefly comments on the implications of the new
mandatory class concepts in relationship to the Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
class.
Part III also explores the unsettled and unsettling universe
of mandatory classes in the post-Ortiz era, discussing the new
uses of mandatory classes that have developed in the past decade
and their uncomfortable fit with the old, pre-existing class action
categories. New cases are pushing old categories, resulting in a
complete analytical blurring of class action categories.
In Part III, I further demonstrate through four illustrations
how these problems have manifested in various ways that en-
courage attorneys to "game the system" for strategic advantage.
This Part analyzes the resulting opportunities for class action
attorneys to creatively "game" the system in pleading and litigat-
ing their class action cases. I argue that systemic incentives en-
courage actors within the justice system to care about opt-out
claimants in ways that have nothing to do with justice or fair-
ness, or, alternatively, that a lack of systemic incentives discour-
ages actors from caring about opt-out claimants. In essence, I ar-
gue that opt-outs in reality are pawns in the class action game, or
are hostages to various actors' interests.
In the Conclusion, I discuss the implications and conse-
quences of the current incoherence concerning the right to opt out
in class action jurisprudence and practice. I suggest that plain-
13 527 US 815 (1999).
151 F3d 402 (5th Cir 1998).
195 F3d 894 (7th Cir 1999).
[2003:182
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tiffs' attorneys, defense counsel, and the judiciary all have incen-
tives to maintain the status quo, and why proposals at either end
of the opt-out spectrum will not likely be adopted. While the aca-
demic debate concerning opt-out rights is interesting, it fails to
account for the true role that opt-outs play in the disposition of
class action litigation. The Article concludes with various ap-
proaches to thinking about the problems of mandatory classes,
and possible ways to preserve the concept of the mandatory class,
ensure due process and fairness, and eliminate opportunities for
gaming the class action system.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE OPT-OUT PROBLEM
Scholars have conceptualized the problem of the right to opt
out of a class action in several different ways,16 although almost
all considerations of the problem are grounded in Rule 23(b)(3),
the so-called "opt-out" class. As will be described below, the three
papers presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum Sym-
posium by Professors Nagareda, Redish, and Rosenberg on the
topic of the right to opt out, all conceptualize the opt-out problem
differently.'7
The Rule 23(b)(1)"5 and (b)(2) class categories are "manda-
tory." Class actions certified under these provisions do not allow
for a claimant to opt out of the class. 9 Thus, discussions of the
6 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt
Out of Class Actions, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1057 (2002); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy,
Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 Harv L Rev 749 (2002); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115
Harv L Rev 831 (2002); Robert L. Serenka, Jr., Propriety of Allowing Class Member to Opt
Out in Class Action Certified Under Subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2) of Rule 23 of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 146 ALR Fed 563 (1998); Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The
Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46
Emory L J 85 (1997); Maximilian A. Grant, The Right Not to Sue: A First Amendment
Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory Class Actions, 63 U Chi L Rev 239 (1996); George
Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class
Actions, 71 NYU L Rev 258 (1996).
" See Parts I B-D.
a See FRCP 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B). There are two different types of mandatory
classes, with different criteria. See generally Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §§1772-76 at 421-516 (West 2d ed 1986).
" Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure at 421-516 (cited in note
18). The plain language of these subsections also does not permit claimants to opt out of
the class. Although the mandatory classes have no provision to permit class members to
exclude themselves, FRCP 23(d)(2) currently does allow a federal judge to notify class
members of the pending action. See FRCP 23(d)(2) ("In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: . . . requiring, for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be
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right to opt out of the 23(b)(3) class have focused on issues such
as the rationales for permitting exclusion from the Rule 23(b)(3)
damage class; whether the right to opt out is a due process right;
the timing of the right to opt out; the methodologies for notifying
class claimants of the right to opt out; the knowledge, under-
standing, and consent of those who choose to opt out; the effects
of opt-out claimants on class settlements; and whether the opt-
out mechanism serves the underlying purposes of the class action
rule.
In addition, the discussion of the right to opt out encom-
passes the debate whether the alternative procedure-to require
putative class members affirmatively to "opt in"-ought to re-
place the current opt-out regime." The debate over "opting-in"
captures many, if not most, of the same issues involved in the
core debates concerning the right to opt out.
A. The Untidy Universe of the Rule 23(b) Classes:
Present at the Creation
The original class action rule had no opt-out provision. Al-
though the original Rule 23 also contained three class categories,
there was no right of exclusion because the original class catego-
ries all contemplated certain juridical relationships among class
members, such that their interests were common or united. The
possibility of a damage class action was severely limited, if not
impossible, because the claims of individual class members in a
damage class were not sufficiently united or common to meet the
requirements of the original rule's three categories.21
The 1966 amendments to the class action rule eliminated the
problematic (and difficult-to-apply) original three class categories
and created three new class categories. The new subdivision (b)
categories were intended to provide functional descriptions of
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in
the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of the members
to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims and defenses, or otherwise to come into the action."). The 2002 amend-
ments to Rule 23(c) add a provision for permissive notice to the mandatory 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(2) classes. See note 11.
As indicated above, the possibility of replacing the current opt-out provision with a
requirement for affirmatively opting in, has been a seductive possibility to the Advisory
Committee over the last decade. This proposal was part of the first set of proposed
amendments that surfaced in early 1991-92, but the idea for an opt-in requirement was
swiftly abandoned. See notes 5-6.
2 See Fleming James Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and John Leubsdorf, Civil Proce-
dure §10.22 at 561-68 (Little Brown 4th ed 1992).
[2003:184
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types of class actions, rather than to prescribe juridical relation-
ships necessary for certification.2
The innovative creation of the 1966 amendments was the
creation of the Rule 23(b)(3) class, commonly known as the "dam-
age" class action." Unlike the 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, which
were intended to capture class claimants with homogenous inter-
ests,24 the 23(b)(3) class action was conceived as a possible class
vehicle for claimants with heterogeneous interests. In recognition
of the heterogeneous nature of the new 23(b)(3) class category,
the 23(b)(3) class further, and innovatively, provided for notice
and a right to opt out.
In creating three entirely new class categories, two of which
were mandatory and binding on all class claimants and one class
category that was not, the Advisory Committee inadvertently
created internal tension among the class categories that has yet
to be resolved and has become increasingly befuddled over time.
Although the 1966 rule reformers had the good intention of
clarifying the class categories and creating simple, functional
class descriptions, they actually set the stage for doctrinal confu-
sion among these class categories. This confusion has resulted in
a downward spiral of analytical incoherence that has led to a
complete blurring of class categories. In short, the 1966 class
categories no longer make sense, and are subject to manipulation
by litigants and the courts alike. 5
Rule 23(b)(3), by its own terms, does not provide for the right
to opt out.2 6 Rather, the right to opt out is derived from Rule
23(c)(2)(A), which provides that the court will exclude a member
from the class if the member requests by a specified date,2" as
well as from Rule 23(c)(2)(B) which indicates that a class action
judgment will include all members who do not request exclusion.28
Id at 563-64.
See id (detailing the mandates of the 1966 Rule 23).
14 The amended Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions were conceptually derived from
the original class categories, based on classes consisting of claimants with homogeneous
interests.
This is discussed and analyzed in greater detail in Part III.
' See FRCP 23(b)(3). The plain language of this subsection merely sets forth the
criteria that a proponent seeking certification must satisfy, and which a court must find,
in order for the court to determine that a class may be maintained as a (b)(3) class.
See FRCP 23(c)(2)(A).
See FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2)(C) also inferentially supports the right to opt
out by indicating that any class member who does not request exclusion may enter an
appearance through counsel.
185
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The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(c)(2)(A) indicates
that the rule "makes special provision for class actions main-
tained under subdivision (b)(3),"" for the right of individual class
members to be excluded from the class. Thus, putative members
of proposed 23(b)(3) classes are afforded this special opportunity
out of respect for the possible strong interests of individuals in
pursuing their own litigation.30 Embedded in this concept is the
notion that 23(b)(3) classes are heterogeneous, and that if indi-
vidual interests are strong enough, the class may lack sufficient
cohesion to warrant certification.31
Problems relating to the right to opt out have been apparent
since the enactment of the 1966 amendments, especially as a con-
sequence of the simultaneous provision for mandatory and opt-
out classes. The class action universe would have been tidy if
class proponents conceptualized their claims neatly within the
functional categories, and pleaded their claims pursuant to one
category."
The rule reformers did not sufficiently anticipate the implica-
tions of an amended rule with three different class categories,
two of which were mandatory and one that was not. In particular,
the rule reformers did not sufficiently anticipate the possibility
that class proponents might plead a proposed class action under
multiple provisions of Rule 23(b).33 Thus, from 1966 forward,
courts have been faced with the practical and conceptual implica-
tions of class actions pled pursuant to more than one subdivision
(b) class category, where class claimants have the ability to ex-
clude themselves from a class-wide judgment under one category,
but are bound under two other class categories (and without no-
tice of the action). Into this breach, therefore, courts have devel-
oped principles governing class certification when pleaders in-
FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendment, Subdivision (c)(2).
Id. The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the individuals' interests in pursu-
ing their own litigations may be so strong as to defeat class certification altogether. See
also FRCP 23(b)(3) (stating predominance requirement); FRCP 23(b)(3)(A) (noting that
interests of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions is one factor in determining predominance).
FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendment, Subdivision (b)(3).
Ironically, the centerpiece of the 1966 Rule 23 reform was to replace the difficult-to-
apply class categories in the original Rule 23 with more descriptive, functional class cate-
gories in the amended rule. See James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure 363-64
(cited in note 21).
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendments provide no guidance to
courts concerning how to evaluate class complaints seeking certification simultaneously
under multiple subdivisions of Rule 23(b).
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voke multiple subsections of Rule 23(b). Notwithstanding the Ad-
visory Committee's admonition that the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out
class is intended to respect the rights of individuals with strong
interests to pursue their own litigation, courts have nonetheless
indicated a preference for certifying classes under the mandatory
23(b)(1) or (b)(2) provisions when presented with a motion for
class certification under the mandatory and opt-out provisions.34
The purported rationale for favoring mandatory 23(b)(1) cer-
tification is to avoid separate litigation that would unduly burden
the judicial system, to protect defendants from the risks of incon-
sistent judgments, and to protect plaintiffs from the impairment
of their interests. 35 The leading federal practice treatise also has
endorsed this principle favoring certification of mandatory
classes, based on the additional rationale that Rule 23(b)(3)
classes require both notice and the opportunity to opt out, and
therefore impose additional financial burdens and constraints on
the litigants."
Apart from expressing a judicial preference for mandatory
classes, these boilerplate rules make little sense. Nor do these
rules mitigate the inherent tension that exists between two cate-
gories of classes that permit no exit from the class, and a third
category that does. A court's decision to certify under the manda-
tory (b) subdivisions, as opposed to the 23(b)(3) provision, has
severe due process consequences for class members. When a court
elects to certify a class under one of the mandatory (b) subdivi-
sions, this decision sacrifices the class claimants' rights to notice
and the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class.
Courts have failed to sufficiently explain why class claimants
who satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) should preferen-
tially have their class certified as a mandatory (b)(1) class, if
counsel pleads both subdivisions. Courts have failed to recognize
that mandatory 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are conceptually differ-
ent than the 23(b)(3) class, in that the former are intended to em-
brace homogeneous classes, while the latter is not.37 Hence, it is
See Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §§1772, 1775, 1777
(cited in note 18). This preference for a mandatory class certification applies when a class
proposed under both 23(b)(3) and (b)(1) satisfies the requirements for certification under
all provisions.
Id at 421-26 (citing cases).
Id (citing cases).
3' Unlike the 23(b)(3) class with a presumption of heterogeneity among class mem-
bers, the presumed homogeneity of the mandatory classes explains why there are no no-
187
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difficult to understand how courts can blithely announce that a
class that satisfies the Rule 23(b)(3) criteria may simultaneously
satisfy the mandatory class criteria, and prefer certification un-
der the mandatory provisions.
Furthermore, many courts' purported justifications for a
mandatory class preference merely recite the language of the
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes in conclusory fashion, without provid-
ing any analytical content justifying the result.38 Nor do these
decisions account for the due process considerations that under-
gird the 23(b)(3) class, as well as the presumed heterogeneous
nature of the 23(b)(3) class. Finally, prudential considerations
such as the additional financial burden of providing notice and
the opt-out right ought not outweigh due process considerations
in denying putative class members these rights through a man-
datory class certification.
B. Professor Nagareda's Deterrence of Opt-Outs Perspective
Professor Richard Nagareda has located the opt-out problem
in the context of Rule 23(b)(3) damage class settlements,39 an ap-
proach that excludes consideration of claims against Rule
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund settlement classes." He justifies this fo-
cus on the opt-out problem in the settlement context (as opposed
to the opt-out problem after certification of a litigation class), on
the ground that most class actions settle, rather than undergo
litigation. Therefore, for Professor Nagareda, concerns about opt-
tice and opt-out provisions for members of these classes, and why due process may not be
offended by binding all members of these classes to a judgment in the action.
See, for example, Reynolds v National Football League, 584 F2d 280, 284 (8th Cir
1978) ("[Wlhen the choice exists between (b)(1) and (b)(3) certification, generally it is
proper to proceed under (b)(1) exclusively in order to avoid inconsistent adjudication or a
compromise of class interests."). See also Van Gemert v Boeing Co, 259 F Supp 125, 130 (S
D NY 1966) (citing exact language of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(1)(B) as justification for
preference for certification under mandatory provisions).
"' Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide
to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U Chi Legal F 141.
" Id at 146, citing Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815 (1999). Professor Nagareda
excludes limited fund settlement classes from his purview because, by definition, member-
ship in Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes is mandatory and does not permit opt-outs. Therefore, the
types of coercive/deterrent techniques to induce claimants not to opt-out of the damage
class settlement are not relevant to his analysis. Inferentially, Professor Nagareda's ap-
proach to the opt-out problem ignores the possibility of an opt-out problem adhering in the
mandatory classes (that is, the negative opt-out problem: that there is no exit from the
class).
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outs ought to focus on the back end settlement process, rather
than the front-end certification process.41
Professor Nagareda's focus on the right to opt out of the back-
end settlement process is justified to the extent that most class
actions are, indeed, settled rather than litigated.42 And, the recent
proposed amendments to Rule 23 provide additional support for
Professor Nagareda's focus on settlement opt-outs, in that the
Advisory Committee ultimately provided a second opportunity to
class claimants to opt out of the class after the class members
have received notice of the actual terms of a proposed class set-
tlement.43 Thus, the Advisory Committee recognized that class
claimants possibly ought to have another chance to opt out of a
class at the point at which they have additional or better infor-
mation concerning the actual terms of a class settlement.
Professor Nagareda's concern with opt-out rights in the con-
text of settlement classes focuses chiefly on the behavior of attor-
neys involved in the settlement process, to the detriment of the
class members' interests."
41 As will be seen, Professor Nagareda is more concerned with the "back-end" of the
class litigation process (that is, settlement), rather than the "front-end" of the class litiga-
tion process (certification of the litigation class). Professor Nagareda's concern for the
back-end opt-out process places him in contrast to Professor Redish, who ultimately ar-
gues in favor of fixing the "front-end" opt-out regime. See discussion of Professor Redish's
argument in Part I C.
42 Professor Nagareda's empirical support for this proposition is Thomas E. Willging,
Laural L. Hooper, and Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 NYU L Rev 74, 143-51 (1996). Generalizations from this re-
port should be approached with some caution, however, as this study reviewed docket
records from only four federal district courts.
' See Levi, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, at 105-06 (establishing a
discretionary opportunity to opt-out of a (b)(3) class settlement after expiration of the
initial opt-out period, without establishing any presumption in favor of providing that
opportunity) (cited in note 1).
" Professor Nagareda's concern, centered on the ethical behavior of attorneys in ne-
gotiating and consummating settlement classes, parallels the chief concern of the aca-
demic literature in the past decade, which largely has focused on attorney behavior in
settlement classes. See, for example, George M. Cohen, The "Fair" Is the Enemy of the
Good: Ortiz v Fibreboard Corporation and Class Action Settlements, 8 S Ct Econ Rev 23
(2000); Susan P. Koniak and George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va L Rev
1051 (1996); Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 Harv L Rev 810 (1996); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 Cor-
nell L Rev 851 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343 (1995); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice,
Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 Cornell L Rev 811 (1995);
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v Amchem Products, Inc, 80
Cornell L Rev 1045 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass
Torts: When the Rules meet the Road, 80 Cornell L Rev 1159 (1995); Charles W. Wolfram,
Mass Torts: Messy Ethics, 80 Cornell L Rev 1228 (1995).
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He essentially argues that because defense counsel desire to
achieve maximum or optimal "closure" through the class action
device, they will deploy an array of devices to deter class claim-
ants from exercising their rights to opt out. In a clever analytical
set-piece, Professor Nagareda rhetorically suggests that the vari-
ous techniques that attorneys use to deter opt-outs run parallel to
the plotline and coercive methods used by the Mafia dons and
thugs in the movie The Godfather. He is especially critical of set-
tlement deals that make class claimants an offer that they "can't
refuse," by artificially making the settlement terms more attrac-
tive than the litigation alternative.45
Basically, Professor Nagareda attacks any means-or combi-
nation of means-by which attorneys implicitly or explicitly in-
duce claimants from opting-out of the class, including anti-
competitive agreements.46 While he does not eschew all attempts
to deter opt-outs, he argues that any justification for the legiti-
macy of an opt-out deterrence strategy must be based on the
"preexistence" principle.47 According to Professor Nagareda, the
"preexistence" principle governing class action jurisprudence is
the proposition that the class action enjoys no mandate to alter
pre-existing rights."5
Although Professor Nagareda makes a normative claim for
eschewing coercive attempts to deter opt-out claimants (based on
the preexistence principle), to his credit he realistically under-
stands that practicing attorneys are and will continue to be end-
lessly inventive in designing new means to deter opt-outs. 49 In
light of this reality, Professor Nagareda comes up somewhat
" Nagareda, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 143-45 (cited in note 39). Apart from the class
action context, he is critical of the structure of the federal 9/11 Victims Compensation
Fund legislation, which he believes proffers claimants a similar coercive choice. See Ena-
bling legislation, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Title IV of Public
Law 107-42 ("Victim Compensation Law"). In the class action realm, he is highly critical of
the recent Sulzer hip implant settlement, which he criticizes for similar deterrence
mechanisms. See In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liability Litigation, 204 FRD 330 (N D
Ohio 2001).
4' Nagareda, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 167-69 (cited in note 39).
Id at 174-75.
" Id at 174-75. Professor Nagareda's "preexistence" principle is explicated at great
length in Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 Colum L Rev 149 (2003). Professor Nagareda's preexistence principle seems to
be an elaborate intellectual embroidery of the structure in the Rules Enabling Act that no
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure can abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. See
28 USC § 2072(b) (2000). See also Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US at 629; Ortiz v
Fibreboard Corp, 527 US at 845-46 (discussing Rules Enabling Act limitations on class
action rule).
4' Nagareda, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 174-75 (cited in note 39).
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short in the prescriptive "what should we do about it?" depart-
ment.
Regarding anti-competition agreements, Professor Nagareda
suggests that the full brunt of the antitrust laws ought to be lev-
eled against class attorneys who build such anti-competitive
agreements into class settlements."0 Regarding all other objec-
tionable Godfather-like behavior, Professor Nagareda merely
suggests that "the law of class actions must maintain a steady
vigilance toward those innovations."51 That is, in effect, the
equivalent of asking the courts to be vigilant against the delivery
of horses' heads to bedrooms, or fish wrapped in newspapers.
What he doesn't tell us is what a real judge in a real court ought
to do when presented with illegitimate (in Nagareda's view) opt-
out deterrent strategy.
The fact that the 2002 amendments to Rule 23(e) offer the
possibility of a second opt-out will not cure Professor Nagareda's
concerns, either. Rather, the second opportunity for opting-out
merely enhances the scenarios for objectionable attorney conduct
in deterring the opt-outs. Thus, if claimants in the future get two
bites at the opt-out apple, attorneys who wish to deter opt-outs
will get two bites, as well (and even more horses' heads).
While Professor Nagareda's perspectives on the opt-out prob-
lem are interesting and compelling, he isolates and tills the opt-
out problem in one small corner of the class action garden. Mix-
ing metaphors, his opt-out analysis focuses on one tree (that is,
the 23(b)(3) damage settlement class), while he chooses not to
survey the entire forest (all of Rule 23, litigation and settlement
classes combined). While he is concerned about potentially coer-
cive behaviors intended to discourage opt-outs from Rule 23(b)(3)
damage settlement classes, his narrow scope does not embrace
the equally compelling (if not more compelling) problem of the
coercive nature of the mandatory 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes,
which offer no opt-outs.
If Professor Nagareda is disturbed by the thought of attor-
neys using illegitimate techniques to discourage opt-outs in (b)(3)
damage classes, he ought to be equally disturbed at the very real
possibility of awarding damages in mandatory (b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes. 2 Arguably, under Professor Nagareda's theory, manda-
Id at 172-74.
5' Id at 175.52 See generally the discussion of mandatory classes that include the possibility of
recovery for damages at Part II C.
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tory classes embody the ultimate illegitimate, coercive settlement
opt-out deterrent strategy (for plaintiffs, defendants, and the ju-
dicial system). Because there is no exit from the mandatory
classes, class members are never even confronted with coercive
Godfather-like choices; the mandatory class is itself the horse's
head in the bed.
C. Professor Redish's Democratic Opt-In Theory
Professor Martin Redish, in contrast to Professor Nagareda,
has located the opt-out problem in the context of a grand, over-
arching theory of class actions grounded in his particular under-
standing of democratic theory.53 Professor Redish's conceptualiza-
tion of the opt-out problem, therefore, focuses neither on a par-
ticular class action tree, nor the entire Rule 23 forest. Rather,
Professor Redish chooses to view the class action rule in relation
to the entire jurisprudential ecosystem.
Professor Redish first attempts to demystify and de-glorify
the class action as the great modern vindicator of substantive
rights-which he thinks is decidedly wrong. For Professor Redish,
the class action attorney is not the modern white knight on the
grand steed, wielding the class action broad-sword to slay the
ghastly corporate dragon. Instead, Professor Redish reminds us
that the class action rule is a procedural housekeeping rule,54
which as such ought to be demoted from its glorious broadsword
role to a more mundane broom-like status.
Central to Professor Redish's thinking about the class action
as a component of the entire jurisprudential ecosystem are a few
simple propositions. First, the class action "was never designed to
serve as a free-standing legal device for the purpose of 'doing jus-
tice,' nor is it a mechanism intended to serve as a roving police-
man of corporate misdeeds5 or as a mechanism by which to redis-
tribute wealth." Second, the class action is "nothing more than
' Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U Chi Legal F 71.
Id at 74-75.
" In this regard Professor Redish seems to be at loggerheads with Professor
Rosenberg, who conceptualizes the class action as the chief means for achieving optimal
deterrence of corporate misdeeds. See discussion of Professor Rosenberg's paper at Part I
D.
r'; Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 74 (cited in note 53). To the extent that this is the
same argument as Professor Nagareda's "preexistence principle," Professors Redish and
Nagareda are on the same Rules Enabling Act page. See discussion of Nagareda's preexis-
tence principle at Part I B.
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an elaborate procedural device designed to facilitate the enforce-
ment of pre-existing substantive law."57
Third, the substantive law vests enforcement of compensa-
tory rights in individual victims, and no person is ever required to
exercise that right of enforcement. It therefore follows that "any
incidental benefit to the public interest is wholly contingent upon
the private victim's decision to seek to judicially enforce her sub-
stantively created remedy."58
Professor Redish recognizes that governments may desire to
punish or deter unlawful behavior through criminal enforcement,
civil penalties, and administrative regulation, in addition to or
instead of private compensatory relief. However, he argues that
when a statute exclusively provides for enforcement of norms by
means of victim compensation, then enforcement by any other
method "profoundly alters the statute's substantive directives." 9
The thrust of these propositions is twofold. First, Professor
Redish would restore the class action to the status of a merely
procedural device enabling the collective vindication of individual
compensatory claims. Second, he would not permit class actions
to take on an independent life as the vindicator of goals or ends
that are not contemplated by the underlying substantive law,
such as punishment or deterrence. Thus, where the underlying
law provides exclusively for compensatory relief, he would dimin-
ish or simply not recognize the much vaunted deterrence ration-
ale for class actions.
Professor Redish then argues, at length, that the central
problem with the modern class action rule, in both structure and
practice, is that the rule permits the compensatory enforcement
model to be transformed into other remedial models that are not
contemplated by the underlying substantive law." Professor Re-
dish argues that these faux class actions constitute "a wholly im-
proper and unacceptable departure from the fundamental pre-
cepts of American democracy, and thus give rise to what can be
described as 'the democratic difficulty."'6' 1
He is particularly aggrieved by "faux" class actions pursued
by opportunistic bounty hunters-class actions that are not in
any realistic sense brought by or on behalf of class members, but
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 74 (cited in note 53).
Id at 76.
Id at 77.
" Id at 72-79.
61 Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 81 (cited in note 53).
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instead by free-ranging class counsel motivated by substantial
attorneys' fees to ferret out corporate misbehavior.62 In addition,
Professor Redish is troubled that most faux class actions wind up
being class actions by default, as a consequence of class members
not exercising their right to opt out.
Thus, for Professor Redish, faux class actions give rise to two
fatal problems of democratic theory: (1) Such class actions are not
compensatory damage classes as they purport to be; and (2) the
disguised bounty hunters-class action counsel-have not been
authorized by the underlying substantive law to enforce other
remedial models.63 Redish notes, "[s]uch a dramatic modification
of the substantive law through resort to an avowedly procedural
device contravenes the fundamental democratic notions of repre-
sentation and accountability, because the process effectively de-
ceives the electorate.""
In order to alter this "intolerable" affront to the normative
precepts of American democracy, Professor Redish urges the Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules, and the Supreme Court, to sub-
stantially alter Rule 23.65 In essence, Professor Redish argues
that both "front-end" and "back-end" reforms are necessary to
make Rule 23 comport with notions of democratic theory. At the
front-end of class litigation, Professor Redish would have the Ad-
visory Committee modify the current opt-out regime in Rule
23(b)(3) actions to be replaced with an affirmative opt-in re-
"' Id at 77. The poster children for Professor Redish's "faux" class actions are those
that result in coupon settlements. See id at 78. For an extensive analysis of problems
relating to coupon settlements, see Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to
Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L Rev
991 (2002). The brouhaha over coupon settlements came into focus in the mid-1990s, with
the Third Circuit's repudiation of the coupon settlement in In re General Motors Corp
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F3d 768 (3d Cir 1995). Not-
withstanding the Third Circuit's decision, coupon settlements (in more sophisticated ver-
sions) continue to be a favored means for resolving many small claims consumer class
actions.
Professor Redish's diatribe against faux class actions, however, is based in his core
theory:
The point, rather, is that these faux class actions seek to advance and
protect the substantive law's behavioral norms by resort to a 'bounty
hunter' remedial model that is very different from the one established in
the substantive law being enforced in the class action.
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 79-80 (cited in note 53).
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 81 (cited in note 53).
Id at 82.
6 Id.
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quirement.66 At the back-end settlement stage, Professor Redish
would amend Rule 23(e) to put more teeth into judicial supervi-
sion over settlement agreements, and prevent rubber-stamp ap-
proval of undemocratic settlements.
Professor Redish's appreciation of the opt-out problem (simi-
lar to Professor Nagareda's) is primarily conceptualized in light of
the current Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class. However, Professor Re-
dish does opine about possible implications for the mandatory
classes. He suggests that his democratic thesis compels the result
that the mandatory feature of the current 23(b)(1) classes be
eliminated; that is, 23(b)(1) compensatory damage classes must
be conceived on the same basis as the 23(b)(3) classes.68 Hence,
Rule 23(b)(1) classes, like the new Redish 23(b)(3) class, would
bind only those persons who affirmatively opted into the class.
Finally, Professor Redish concedes that pure 23(b)(2) injunc-
tive classes might be the exception to his opt-in regime, and
therefore the Advisory Committee arguably might "leave the pro-
cedure for the initiation of 23(b)(2) classes unchanged." 9
In summary, Professor Redish would have the Advisory
Committee and the Supreme Court amend Rule 23 so that Rule
23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(3) classes all required class claim-
ants to opt-in. He would eliminate the opt-out option, leave Rule
23(b)(2) unchanged, and further modify Rule 23(e) to provide re-
quired criteria for judicial settlement approvals.
Professor Redish is to be highly commended for elevating the
class action reform debate to a higher analytical plane. He is to
be commended for supplying an underlying political theory for a
procedural rule that is sorely deficient in theoretical underpin-
nings. 7' He is to be further commended for clearly explaining how
that democratic political theory compels amendment of Rule 23 to
require an opt-in procedure, rather than an opt-out procedure.
" Id at 130-32. Professor Redish also would restrict class certifications where there
exists doubt that truly compensatory relief could ever be fashioned. Redish, 2003 U Chi
Legal F at 133.
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 132-33 (cited in note 53).
Id at 131.
Id at 132.
70 The class action literature is largely bereft of grand theoretical speculation, let
alone political theory of any sort. For a recent attempt to conceptualize the class action
rule, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L
Rev 913, 918 (1998) (articulating the "entity" theory of class actions). Professor Redish
takes Professor Shapiro to task for this "entity" theory of class actions. See Redish, 2003 U
Chi Legal F at 97 (cited in note 53).
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However, two practical points nag.7' First, either Professor
Redish's Article is highly timely, or if not, there is an element of
barn door closing after the horse is out, as a consequence of the
2002 Rule 23 revision package-which includes no change to the
opt-out regime. As Professor Redish realizes, the Advisory Com-
mittee initially considered changing the opt-out regime to an opt-
in regime during its first round of Rule 23 revisions in 1992, at
which time the proposal was withdrawn.72 Professor Redish en-
tertains the hope that Rule 23 revisions have not been put to bed
with the 2002 revision package, but that the opt-out/opt-in debate
may live to see another day.
Second, even Professor Redish's highly developed and per-
suasive presentation leaves some untidy ends in the context of
existing class action jurisprudence. His proposal would leave the
current 23(b)(2) class action intact, with no opt-in requirement.
But, as class action jurisprudence has developed, it is possible to
seek compensatory damages in 23(b)(2) actions. Would he require
opt-ins in such situations, or eliminate the possibility of hybrid
class actions? Indeed, do Professor Redish's proposals eliminate
the need for gerry-built hybrid class actions? That might be an
unintended benefit of his proposed reforms. But we will still need
to know what to do with 23(b)(2) class actions that seek compen-
satory damages.
Further, the current 23(b)(3) action requires satisfaction of
the additional elements of predominance and superiority, evalu-
ated in part by the factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3)(A) through (D).
Would the opt-in regime render these additional requirements for
the 23(b)(3) class unnecessary? And, if Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B)
compensatory classes are no longer mandatory, but require the
same opt-in procedure as 23(b)(3) classes, what purpose exists for
delineating separate classes anymore? Do Professor Redish's pro-
posals essentially flatten the class action rule into one big indis-
tinguishable class action procedure? Post-Redish reform, why
should Rule 23 delineate different class categories, at all-except
for the anomalous injunctive relief class?
" In addition to the practical implications of Professor Redish's proposals, one won-
ders whether his analysis gives insufficient consideration to the fact that the underlying
substantive law for many claims incorporates not only compensatory relief, but also deter-
rence, as enforcement goals. One wonders whether his preference for an opt-in regime
applies equally to enforcement of claims that incorporate the goals of compensation, pun-
ishment, and deterrence.
12 See note 21.
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Thus, if Professor Redish is correct, the ultimate implications
of his theoretical model as well as his proposed solutions go a long
way towards supporting my thesis: that the current Rule 23 class
categories have been hopelessly blurred and rendered function-
ally meaningless, in all but label and historical curiosity. Profes-
sor Redish's proposed solutions, then, would deliver the final coup
de grace to current fantastical class action concoctions, and ren-
der this practical reality-there is but one class action and it
shall be an opt-in class action-as the rule.
D. Professor Rosenberg's Optimal Deterrence,
No Opt-Out Theory
If Professor Redish is maniacal on the point that class
actions should embody democratic theory, then Professor David
Rosenberg is equally maniacal that they should not: he is the
arch anti-democrat. 3 Where Professor Redish would require eve-
rybody to opt in, Professor Rosenberg would prohibit anyone from
opting out. Moreover, Professor Rosenberg seemingly cares less
about the compensatory model of class actions that are the lynch-
pin for Professor Redish's theory. Instead, Professor Rosenberg
focuses his discussion on the deterrence theory, insurance, and
individual welfare benefits as the centerpieces for his argument
against opt-outs from any form of class action.
To his credit, Professor Rosenberg's proposed vision of the
ideal class action rule does follow ineluctably from his preference
for the optimal deterrence/insurance model.74 In highly colorful
" David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U Chi Legal F 19. Professor Rosenberg's Article is an elaboration
and continuation of his life's work arguing in favor of a mandatory model for class action
litigation. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv L Rev 831 (2002); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and
Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 NYU L Rev 210 (1996);
David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice By Collective
Means, 62 Ind L J 561 (1987).
14 I do not purport to understand exactly what is it that Professor Rosenberg has
written or argued in his paper. Professor Rosenberg's Article is the most abstruse of the
three pieces relating to the opt-out problem, characterized at times by impenetrable jar-
gon. In reading through Professor Rosenberg's Article, one is reminded of the requirement
in the original Field Code that complaints shall contain "[a] statement of facts constituting
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended." See NY
Laws 1849 c 379 at § 142, 2 (1849 amendments to the original 1848 New York Field code).
All law review articles ought to adopt the Field Code's pleading prescription and be writ-
ten in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is in-
tended. Having said this, however difficult Professor Rosenberg's Article, the failings are
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prose, Professor Rosenberg faults the Judicial Conference and the
Advisory Committee for missing their great opportunity to punch-
up the class action rule to enable the civil justice system to pun-
ish and deter corporate malfeasors." Professor Rosenberg be-
lieves this end can only be accomplished by exponentially increas-
ing the size of the aggregate litigation threat by forcing everyone
into the class action."6
The Judicial Conference's failure, he claims, results from the
Conference's narrow-minded perspectives as "myopic procedural-
ists."' A myopic proceduralist, in Professor Rosenberg's view, is a
rulemaker who lacks an underlying theoretical appreciation of
the goals of the civil justice system, and who ignores the deter-
rence, compensation, and welfare effects of the substantive law.
Instead, this simple-minded proceduralist engages in "shoddy
cost-benefit analysis," generally disregards "pre-suit, ex ante con-
ditions," and relies on "vacuous and question-begging moral-
isms."7"
As a result of its myopic approach, the Judicial Conference's
choice of an opt-out regime for the Rule 23(b)(3) class was based
purely on instrumental but misguided rationales.79 In addition,
the Judicial Conference's creation of a second opportunity for opt-
ing out at the time of settlement is similarly flawed and analyti-
cally weak. Professor Rosenberg argues that not only does an opt-
out not substantially improve class members' information, but it
is not needed to prevent sweetheart settlement deals. °
Professor Rosenberg is not content to fault just the rulemak-
ers. He also takes to task the Supreme Court and federal judici-
mine, not his. While I make no claims to understanding his arguments (leaving this task
to better minds than mine), I do make some claims to at least grasping the gist of his
argument and proposals.
7 Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 19-20 (cited in note 73). Professor Rosenberg
attacks the Judicial Conference for having "squandered" its opportunity to revise the
"flawed" 1966 amendments, thereby blowing their chance "to make matters much better."
He describes the conduct of corporate defendants as business risk-taking or "mass produc-
tion risks." Id.
" Id at 24.
17 No sycophant he; Professor Rosenberg is to be commended for not currying favor
with the rulemakers.
" Id at 19 n 2. Ordinarily one would think that this sort of attack would result in
Professor Rosenberg's being uninvited from any future meetings or conferences by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure,
and the Judicial Conference. However intellectually dull these rulemakers, I know them
to be a highly charitable group of myopic proceduralists who would not hold it against
Professor Rosenberg and who would, indeed, share a cocktail with him.
Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 19-20 (cited in note 73).
Id at 36.
198 [2003:
177] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
ary, in decisions interpreting and applying Rule 23, for similarly
constraining the deterrence and insurance benefits that might be
achieved through the class action device. He is highly critical of
what he characterizes as the post-Amchem Rule 23 default posi-
tion, which he suggests is grounded in an "anti-redistribution
principle" as the test for fairness in class action recoveries." The
problem with this default position, Rosenberg argues, is that it
"implies the general subordination, if not irrelevance, of insur-
ance theory and objectives in the allocation of damages among
class members."
8 2
Professor Rosenberg further argues that the Judicial Confer-
ence was misguided in believing that an opt-out provision would
effectuate the anti-redistribution principle (and by extension, the
double-opt-out provision).83 He suggests that the redistribution
principle does not require opt-out prior to certification, at settle-
ment, or at any other point. "Rather, providing any opportunity
for exit from the class action will undermine not only the anti-
redistribution principle.., but also the basic deterrence objective
of collective adjudication together with any insurance benefit."4
Professor Rosenberg's argument proceeds from a general
normative theory of collectivized adjudication, through a law and
economics analysis of the potential for market regulation of mass
production risks. He concludes that well known market failures
impel regulation to override the market. Further, to achieve the
optimal deterrent effect, Professor Rosenberg would "decouple"
liability determinations from damage calculation and distribu-
tion.85
Finally, Professor Rosenberg addresses possible critics by
arguing that an opt-out is not needed to satisfy the desire of any
class member for individualized recovery based on a separate
trial, because the provisions for intervention or issue-classing can
accommodate such interests without allowing opt-out.86
8! Id at 21-22.
82 Id at 22.
Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 22-23 (cited in note 73). To the contrary, Profes-
sor Rosenberg argues that the double-opt-out provision embodied in the 2002 amendments
defeats whatever benefits a settlement class might provide, is unnecessary, and also is
destructive of the anti-redistribution principle. Id.
Id at 23.
Id at 31.
Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 48-49 (cited in note 73). Professor Rosenberg
argues that the central point is that so long as class-wide aggregation and optimal in-
vestment on the common questions achieves optimal deterrence goals, determining and
distributing recoveries are wholly independent, secondary matters. We are therefore free
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It is somewhat difficult to critique Professor Rosenberg's ar-
guments without falling into the error of myopic proceduralism.
While Professor Rosenberg's arguments are both intuitively and
logically persuasive, there is something disquieting about a set of
recommendations that places the judicial system in the position
of free-ranging regulator. It is even more disconcerting that Pro-
fessor Rosenberg's vision of aggregative justice permits, encour-
ages, or requires courts on their own initiative to institute class
action procedures to regulate perceived defects in the market-
place.87 Surely this is a version of judicial activism run amok, and
one that is antithetical to the American model of adversary jus-
tice.
Finally, Professor Rosenberg seemingly glosses over individ-
ual justice issues, justifying the lack of an opt-out procedure with
two classic, class action band-aids: the suggestion of possible sub-
classing or intervention. This is the most under-developed portion
of Professor Rosenberg's thesis, and there is little empirical sup-
port for the suggestion that these two devices actually do allevi-
ate the concerns of individualized justice. Nonetheless, Professor
Rosenberg invokes these possible procedures in mantra-like fash-
ion as the remedies for forced collective justice.
E. The Opt-Out Problem Viewed on a Continuum
In summary, Professors Nagareda, Redish, and Rosenberg
have viewed the opt-out problem as a problem of political theory
and collective justice. Professor Nagareda's and Redish's conclu-
sions are animated by a theory of participatory democracy. Thus,
in their constructs, coercion is bad and voluntary assent through
opting in is good. Professor Redish, in particular, has a kind of
bottoms-up view for legitimating class action practice.
At the other end of the continuum, Professor Rosenberg is
seemingly the anti-democrat: he envisions a universe of manda-
tory-only class actions, with no opt-out option, whether voluntary
or not. In contrast to Professor Redish's construct, Professor
Rosenberg's vision is a top-down autocratic view of justice. It pos-
its an actor who seemingly knows what is best for society, and
what wrongs require punishment or redress. Professor
to continue committing scarce legal resources on the damage-award lottery that its chief,
legal-profession beneficiaries disguise with socially irresponsible and intellectual bogus
arguments about individual entitlements to pursue maximum claim-related wealth.
" One might argue that some state and federal courts, which conduct less than "rig-
orous" class certification scrutiny, are already functioning in this capacity.
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Rosenberg's vision utilizes mandatory collective procedure to
remedy and punish for designated wrongs. Of the three ap-
proaches, Professor Rosenberg's critique sets forth a free-
standing vision that is the most removed from historical, current,
and practical class action jurisprudence.
II. THE OPT-OUT PROBLEM THROUGH ANOTHER LENS: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MANDATORY CLASS SINCE 1966
In truth, class action jurisprudence historically has treated
the problem of opt-outs as one of myopic proceduralism. However,
neither the Supreme Court, the lower federal appellate courts,
nor the advisory civil rules committees should be faulted for this
myopia. Concrete and particular issues relating to class action
practice and procedure arise in typically narrow rule contexts,
and the courts have generally eschewed grand theoretical pro-
nouncements-let alone discussions of political theory-in their
analyses of class action problems. Theorists searching for collec-
tive justice theory are bound for disappointment.
There are a number of reasons why federal courts have not
articulated grand, sweeping theories undergirding the class ac-
tion rule. Generally, the federal courts have adhered to well-
known canons of judicial construction and therefore when pre-
sented with class action issues on appeal, the courts have tended
to resolve the issues on narrow Rule 23 constructions, rather
than on more sweeping constitutional or theoretical grounds. The
Supreme Court, most recently in both Amchem and Ortiz, de-
clined to address an array of constitutional issues raised by those
cases, but instead chose to decide the appeals based on Rule 23
grounds alone.88
In addition, the federal courts' broadest considerations of the
class action rule have been limited to considerations of the rule's
due process underpinnings. To the extent that any federal courts
have considered the broader meanings of the class action rule,
such discussions merely have reflected careful readings of the
historical antecedents of contemporary class actions, as illumi-
nated by the Advisory Committee's Notes.
See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 612-13 (1997); Ortiz v Fibre-
board Corp, 527 US 815, 830-32 (1999).
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A. The Due Process Implications of the Class Action Rule
If the Supreme Court has ever grounded any consideration of
the class action rule in theoretical understanding, that discussion
is located in the Court's appreciation of the representational na-
ture of the class action, and the consequent due process implica-
tions of the class action rule.
In 1940, two years after the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court noted that the class action
mechanism is an exception to the traditional principle that one
cannot be bound to a judgment unless one was a party to the law-
suit in the traditional sense." To ensure procedural fairness,
however, the Supreme Court recognized that absent or unnamed
parties to a class action litigation could be bound to a court's
judgment only if the named class representatives adequately rep-
resented the common interest of the class.9" Constitutional due
process concerns, then, are satisfied by judicial scrutiny of the
adequacy of class representation and certification of the common
interests and typicality of class members.
As is well known, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
completely revamped Rule 23 during the early 1960s, culminat-
ing in the 1966 revision to the class action rule that has been in
place until the 2002 amendments. The centerpiece of this revision
of Rule 23 was the creation of the new 23(b) class action catego-
ries.
The purpose of completely re-writing the class action catego-
ries was to eliminate uncertainties that had developed regarding
the application of the original rule's classifications. The new Rule
23(b) categories also were intended to be "functional" categories,
and to relate to types of class actions known to exist at the time
the Advisory Committee undertook its rule revision project.
These endeavors resulted in the creation of two "mandatory"
class action categories: the new Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) catego-
ries.9 The great innovative contribution of the 1966 rule revision,
however, was the creation of the new (b)(3) class category-a
class action for damages that included the claimant's right to be
excluded from the class action upon "opting out."92 The mandatory
classes included no such provision for opting out of the class.
See Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 41 (1940).
Id at 41-43.
91 See FRCP 23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2).
9' See FRCP 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(2).
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In the class action arena, the decade following the 1966 revi-
sion to the class action rule was largely the great era of public
interest law litigation, or institutional reform litigation. This era
was characterized chiefly by aggressive use of the Rule 23(b)(2)
injunctive relief class, and decisional law in this period was pre-
occupied chiefly with certification questions relating to (b)(2)
classes. Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(3) classes played a less obviously pre-
dominant role.
B. Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts: 3 The Focus on Opt-Out
Rights
Significantly, it would take almost twenty years after the
1966 rule revision for the Supreme Court to focus on due process
concerns relating to class action procedure-and forty-five years
after the Supreme Court's oblique reference to due process and
fairness concerns in Hansberry v Lee.94 In 1985, the Supreme
Court finally focused the class action conversation on the due
process concerns of absent class members in Phillips Petroleum
Co v Shutts.95
In Shutts, the Supreme Court revisited the question of con-
stitutional due process as it relates to class action procedure,
holding that due process is not violated when a state court as-
serts personal jurisdiction over absent class members who have
minimal contacts with the state in which the litigation is con-
ducted." Though the Court recognized that res judicata applies tojudgments rendered against plaintiffs and forecloses relitigation
of actually litigated damage claims, the Court held that due proc-
ess concerns are satisfied by various procedural safeguards in the
class action rule.9" Thus, before a class action may be certified,
courts must determine whether the interests of plaintiffs are
common and typical, and whether class counsel and class repre-
sentatives can adequately represent those common interests.
In addition, absent plaintiffs are protected by various re-
quirements that the action may not be dismissed or compromised
without a notice and approval of the court. Furthermore, in class
actions seeking damages, the due process rights of absent class
" 472 US 797 (1985).
311 US 32, 41-43 (1940).
" 472 US 797 (1985). The remainder of Part II is adapted from Linda S. Mullenix,
Getting to Shutts, 46 U Kan L Rev 727 (1998).
Shutts, 472 US at 811-12.
17 Id at 812-13.
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members are protected by the opportunity to opt out of the class
and, thereby, preserve the right to subsequently litigate individ-
ual damage claims without being bound by the class judgment.
The Court's focus in Shutts was on the requirements of con-
stitutional due process as they relate to a state court's personal
jurisdiction over non-resident class plaintiffs. Because the Court
viewed the principles of personal jurisdiction as chiefly defen-
dant-oriented-that is, protecting non-resident defendants-the
Court held that due process did not require all class plaintiffs to
have minimal contacts with the state for the class judgment to
have binding effect.98 Nor did the Court believe that certain plain-
tiffs' lack of minimal contacts with the state subverted due proc-
ess protections in the class-action context.
In essence, the Court concluded that the various due process
protections of the class-action rule sufficiently protected absent
class members, and that in 23(b)(3) opt-out classes especially, the
ability to opt out enhanced that due process protection. Thus, a
class member's failure to exclude himself or herself from the
class, after receiving adequate notice of the action, constituted
consent to the action, consent to the court's jurisdiction, and con-
sent to be bound by the class judgment.99
Although the Supreme Court in Shutts concluded that a state
court constitutionally could assert personal jurisdiction over ab-
sent class members in 23(b)(3) opt-out classes, as long as class
certification requirements were satisfied, the Court qualified its
decision by limiting it to "those class actions which seek to bind
known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominantly for
money judgments."' ° In its famous footnote 3, the Court further
explained that it intimated "no view concerning other types of
class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief.""'
While affirming the binding effect of class judgments on ab-
sent class members who do not opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tions, the enduring legacy of the Shutts decision, it turned out,
was that of the Court's footnote 3. This footnote left open the
problem concerning what process, if any, is due to class members
in the so-called mandatory classes.
See id at 807, 811.
See generally Shutts, 472 US at 813-14.
Id at 811 n 3.
Id at 811-12 n 3.
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C. The Post-Shutts Era: The Persistent Problem of Mandatory
Classes
The Court's vague and somewhat cryptic suggestion in foot-
note 3 subsequently gave rise to what is commonly referred to as
the "Shutts" problem: namely, what due process is required in
class actions that are not predominantly for damages, presuma-
bly the 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. Between 1985 and the early
1990s, lower federal courts split regarding whether mandatory
non-opt-out classes were illegitimate in the absence of due proc-
ess protections, or whether mandatory classes could be sustained
provided certain due process protections."2
The Supreme Court had two separate opportunities during
the 1990s to directly address and resolve the Shutts problem, in
Ticor Title Insurance Co v Brown"0 3 and Adams v Robertson.!0 On
both occasions, the Court granted certorari to review appeals
raising the Shutts issue, but in both instances (after briefing and
oral argument), the Court determined that it had improvidently
granted certorari.
During the post-Shutts decade, the Shutts decision caused
mischief in 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions that also included
claims for monetary damages, sometimes called "hybrid" class
actions because of the mixed nature of the relief, both equitable
and legal, that the claimants seek. Lower federal and state courts
responded differently to the due process problems raised by man-
datory mixed-relief or hybrid class actions. Most courts followed
the hornbook rule for 23(b)(2) injunctive and declaratory classes,
which is to look to the predominant relief sought in the com-
plaint. If the class seeks predominantly equitable relief, then the
court may certify a 23(b)(2) non-opt-out action that also may in-
clude "incidental" damage claims, without violating the due proc-
ess clause. The most prominent illustrations of this approach are
(b)(2) employment discrimination class actions under the federal
civil rights statutes for injunctive and declaratory relief, but
which also seek incidental damages in the form of backpay.
Other courts have permitted and certified mandatory hybrid
class actions that include monetary damage claims, provided that
0 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plain-
tiffs' Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U C Davis L Rev 871 (1995)
(discussing split among courts in post-Shutts era).
' 511 US 117 (1994).
04 520 US 87 (1997).
' Ticor Title, 511 US at 118; Adams, 520 US at 92.
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the class claimants were provided with additional due process
protections not specifically required by the rule, such as notice or
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
the absent class members. As long as the court ensured that the
due process rights of absent class members with monetary claims
were not violated, several lower federal courts have held that
mandatory classes do not require an opt-out right to comport with
due process. This approach has been extended to mass tort set-
tlement classes, allowing at least one federal circuit to uphold
certification and approval of a mandatory settlement class resolv-
ing compensatory claims that did not include an opt-out right.10 6
Still other courts have refused to certify mandatory mixed-
relief class actions. Instead, these courts require claimants to
separate their monetary damage claims from their equitable re-
lief claims, and to seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3) to afford
class members with monetary damage claims the additional due
process protections of notice and the right to opt out. Finally, the
Ninth Circuit has refused to give binding, preclusive effect to
mandatory 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class settlements that forfeited
class members' compensatory damage claims, where the absent
class members lacked contacts with the forum approving the set-
tlement and the class members had no right to opt out of the
class.
The persistent due process issue engendered by the Shutts
problem again came before the Supreme Court in Ortiz.'°7 This
case dealt with a nationwide asbestos settlement certified under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the so-called limited fund provision. It cannot be
doubted that the Ortiz settlement was a settlement for damages,
and not a mandatory class for injunctive or declaratory relief. As
such, the Ortiz settlement squarely raised the problem of what
due process requires in a mandatory class that is predominantly
for monetary damages.
In Ortiz, however, the Shutts problem inherent in the Ortiz
mandatory 23(b)(1)(B) settlement class was not the major focus of
the litigants' arguments, '°8 and the Court dealt summarily with
"6 See Flanagan v Ahearn, 90 F3d 963 (5th Cir 1996). The Fifth Circuit's approval of
the Ahearn settlement was subsequently disapproved and reversed by the Supreme Court
in its 1999 decision in Ortiz.
,o 527 US 815 (1999).
, The Court instead focused on the requirements for certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
limited fund, the criteria for proof of the limited fund class, and other threshold class
certification problems, such as Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy and conflict of interest problems.
See generally id.
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the 23(b)(1)(B) due process issue."0 9 Nonetheless, the Court in
Ortiz recognized the existence of a Shutts problem, and expressed
concern over the due process issues inherent in 23(b)(1)(B)
classes. " ' Although the Court had the opportunity to elucidate
the due process requirements for mandatory, non-opt-out classes,
the Supreme Court did not resolve the Shutts problem that was
presented in the facts of that case.
D. Reflections on the Shutts Problem Post-Ortiz
With the advent of the new millennium, the scorecard on the
Shutts problem reflects the following: (1) the Supreme Court has
yet to definitively rule on the Shutts problem; (2) the Court has
expressed unease and concern over the due process implications
of mandatory 23(b)(1)(B) classes, and (3) the federal courts are all
over the map concerning what due process requires for manda-
tory classes.
Added to this mix is the fact that the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, in its revision of Rule 23 over the past decade, has
declined to take on and resolve the due process problems, particu-
larly concerning opt-out rights in its rule revisions.' Approxi-
mately eighteen years after Shutts, the Shutts problem still ex-
ists, and in this doctrinal void, court decisions have grown con-
ceptually more murky.
Moreover, in the post-Ortiz era, the Shutts problem has given
rise to two conceptually distinct modes of analysis, with one ap-
proach for 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory classes and another approach
for 23(b)(2) mandatory classes. The Ortiz branch has addressed
due process concerns related to mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) lim-
ited fund classes. A second branch, derivative of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decisions in Allison v Citgo"2 and Bolin v Sears, Roebuck &
Co," 3 and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jefferson v Ingersoll
See id at 838-41.
"o See id at 847 ("And in settlement-only class actions the procedural protections built
into the Rule to protect the rights of absent class members during litigation are never
invoked in an adversarial setting... In related circumstances, we raised the flag on this
issue of due process more than a decade ago in Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts . . ").
Although the Court described the Shutts case and holdings, the Court failed to apply the
Shutts principles, or the implications of footnote 3, to the Ortiz 23(b)(1)(B) settlement
class. See Ortiz, 527 US at 848 n 24.
.. See discussion at notes 5-6.
"' 151 F3d 402 (5th Cir 1998).
"3 231 F3d 970 (5th Cir 2000).
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International, Inc"4 has given rise to a separate analytical ap-
proach for 23(b)(2) classes and has created yet another new con-
cept of "hybrid" certification.
The Ortiz, Allison, and Jefferson branches of the due process
argument, as they relate to mandatory classes, are unsatisfying.
Taken together, the principles these cases set forth are doctri-
nally and analytically inconsistent. Rather than making progress
in resolving the due process conundrums of the mandatory class,
the decisional law has further muddied the class action terrain.
Thus, it is well overdue for the Supreme Court to resolve the
Shutts issue. The Court needs to providently grant proper certo-
rari in a Shutts problem case, and move beyond expressing con-
stitutional concern for class members captured in mandatory
classes.
E. Mandatory Classes in the Post-Ortiz Era
1. Mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund classes and
Ortiz due process concerns.
There can be little doubt that the Ortiz limited fund settle-
ment class implicated a Shutts problem. The settlement was a
nationwide class settlement. Because the settlement created a
monetary fund for class claimants, there can be little doubt that
Ortiz was a settlement class predominantly for damages. And, as
a 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class, class members were not afforded
an opt-out right."5 Clearly, the Ortiz settlement raised the ques-
tion whether such a mandatory class that was predominantly for
damages could satisfy due process where the class claimants
could not meaningfully opt out of the class, or by implication ren-
der consent to be bound by the judgment."'
Throughout the extended Ortiz litigation and on appeal to
the Supreme Court, the litigants recognized the existence of a
195 F3d 894 (7th Cir 1999).
The settlement contained a so-called "back-end" opt-out right, which the Petitioners
contended was a meaningless opt-out provision affording no meaningful due process to
class claimants. See Brief for Petitioners, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp, 1997 US Briefs 1704,
at * 13, 39 n 37 ("The 'back-end' exit provided in the settlement is mere 'window dressing,'
not a meaningful opt-out right .... in large part because the settlement's multiple limits
on recovery restrict even jury awards.").
"' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding the original Ahearn settlement
class that subsequently was denominated the Ortiz settlement class, had held that Phil-
lips Petroleum Co v Shutts did not require that class members be afforded an opportunity
to opt out of the class. See Ahearn, 90 F3d at 986-87.
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Shutts problem. However, because of the extensive and complex
array of issues raised by the novel Ortiz limited fund settlement,
scant briefing and argument was devoted to the Shutts issue."7
In turn, the Court in its lengthy Ortiz opinion, made only
passing reference to the Shutts problem."' However, the Court
did recognize the problems inherent in mandatory damage
classes, and the due process significance of the lack of an opt-out
opportunity for class members captured in a damage class action.
The Court emphasized the fact that mandatory class actions
magnified the problems of achieving collective justice, because
class members had no inherent right to opt out of the class:
The inherent tension between representative suits and the
day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damages
claims gathered in a mandatory class. Unlike Rule 23(b)(3)
class members, objectors to the collectivism of a manda-
tory subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no inherent right to
abstain. The legal rights of absent class members (which
in a class like this one would include claimants who by
definition may be unidentifiable when the class is certi-
fied) are resolved regardless of either their consent, or, in
a class with objectors, their express wish to the contrary."'
The Court further noted that, "[iun related circumstances, we
raised the flag on this issue of due process more than a decade
ago,"120 describing the Shutts case and its holdings. Noting that
the Shutts holdings were limited to class actions "wholly or pre-
dominantly for money judgments," 2' the Court reiterated its con-
cern that before a class member's rights could be extinguished,
due process required notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the
opportunity to exclude one's self from the class. 22
However, notwithstanding the Court's reflections on Shutts
in Ortiz, the Court did not resolve the Shutts issue present on the
' See Brief for Petitioners, Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 1997 US Briefs 1704 at *13, 39-
42 (cited in note 115) (arguing the existence of the Shutts problem by virtue of the inabil-
ity of class claimants to opt-out of the settlement); Brief of Respondents, Ortiz v Fibre-
board Corp, 1997 US Briefs 1704, at *13, 42-44 (contending no Shutts problem at all and
inapplicability of Shutts to federal class actions); Reply Brief of Petitioners, Ortiz v Fibre-
board Corp, 1997 US Briefs 1704, at *13, 18-19.
.. See Ortiz, 527 US at 846-48.
Id at 846-47.
0 Id at 847.
Id at 848 n 24.
Ortiz, 527 US at 848.
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facts. Instead, the Court cryptically raised another due process
flag. The Court's failure to squarely address the Shutts issue in
Ortiz has again left the lower federal courts in the lurch concern-
ing what due process requires in mandatory 23(b)(1)(B) or (b)(2)
classes for damages with no opt-out right."3 At best, the courts
have agreed that while Ortiz adopted no per se rule regarding
opt-out rights for mandatory class action, the courts have none-
theless recognized the Court's "growing concern regarding the
constitutionality of certifying mandatory classes when monetary
damages are at issue." 1
24
2. Mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) classes and the emergence of the
new "hybrid" class action.
The problems relating to mandatory classes have been fur-
ther muddied by a series of lower federal court decisions that dis-
agree about whether claimants may seek damages through a
23(b)(2) mandatory class.' 2' This split has been engendered by the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Allison,'2 6 which repudiated the ability
of a class to recover damages in a 23(b)(2) Title VII case, and the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Jefferson,27 which has created a new
"hybrid" action that would permit simultaneous prosecution of a
class action for equitable relief and legal damages.'28
a) Allison and the new predominance requirement. In Alli-
son, the Fifth Circuit repudiated the ability of class claimants to
23 See, for example, Molski v Gleich, 307 F3d 1155, 1164-67 (9th Cir 2002)(noting
that the Ortiz court expressed concern about certifying mandatory classes with monetary
damages but did not adopt a per se rule); In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc, 221 F3d
870, 881 (6th Cir 2000) ("Certification under subsection (b)(1)(B), which does not include
these protections, must be carefully scrutinized and sparingly utilized."); Jefferson, 195
F3d at 897 (noting that whether Rule 23(b)(2) can be used to certify a "no-notice, no-opt-
out class when compensatory or punitive damages are in issue" is an open question in the
Seventh Circuit). But see In re American Family Enterprises, 256 BR 377, 416 (D NJ 2000)(finding no constitutional or other right to opt-out of a 23(b)(1)(B) or 23(b)(2) mandatory
class, citing numerous cases).
Molski, 307 F3d at 1166.
25 See, for example, Taylor v District of Columbia Water & Sewer Authority, 205 FRD
43, 48-51 (D DC 2002) (describing conflict among the Circuits concerning the split be-
tween the Fifth Circuit's Allison decision and the Seventh Circuit's Jefferson decision);
Robinson v Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co, 267 F3d 147, 165-66 (2d Cir 2001) (de-
clining to adopt Allison approach); Reeb v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation, 203 FRD
315, 323 (S D Ohio 2001) (rejecting Allison principles and describing conflict among the
federal courts); Robertson v Sikorsky Aircraft Corp, 2000 WL 33381019, *8 (D Conn) (de-
scribing conflict among courts concerning Allison precedent).
16 151 F3d 402 (5th Cir 1998).
12 195 F3d 894 (7th Cir 1999).
,28 Jefferson, 195 F3d at 898.
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seek and recover monetary damages through the auspices of a
mandatory 23(b)(2) class. Perhaps the major question surround-
ing the Allison decision concerns whether the Fifth's Circuit's
bright line rules apply only to the Title VII context, or have more
far-reaching implications for any class that seeks monetary dam-
ages under one of the mandatory classes.129 Nonetheless, defense
attorneys broadly invoke the Allison decision for the proposition
that claimants may not seek damage class actions under the
mandatory class provisions.
At any rate, the Allison decision, rather than articulating
new concepts, based its conclusions on the established precept
that plaintiffs may recover monetary damages in a 23(b)(2) action
only if those damages are "incidental" to the predominant form of
declaratory or injunctive relief. Conversely, if monetary damages
are the predominant form of relief, then the class may not be cer-
tified as a 23(b)(2) mandatory class.
The Fifth Circuit's Allison decision attempted to provide
some clarity to the concept of predominance of claims and reme-
dies in mandatory classes. In particular, the decision attempted
to set forth rules by which courts may determine when money
damages predominate. It declared that monetary relief predomi-
nates unless it is incidental to the declaratory or injunctive re-
lief.131 Incidental monetary relief flows "directly from liability to
the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunc-
tive or declaratory relief."
131
The Fifth Circuit, in describing the predominance test for
23(b)(2) classes, also embraced the underlying concept of homo-
geneity of claims and damages among class members. Thus, in
order for damages to be incidental to a 23(b)(2) class claim, the
damages should at least be capable of computation by means of
objective standards and not dependent in any significant way on
the intangible, subjective differences of each class member's cir-
cumstances. Liability for incidental damages should not require
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each indi-
vidual's case."'
" See, for example, Coleman v GMAC, 296 F3d 443 (6th Cir 2002) (applying and
extending Allison principles to action brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and vacating and remanding certification of a mandatory 23(b)(2) damage class action).
" Allison, 151 F3d at 415.
131 Id.
32 Id. See also Miller v Hygrade Food Products Corp, 198 FRD 638, 641-42 (E D Pa
2001) (adopting these standards).
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In applying these principles to the facts in Allison, the Fifth
Circuit noted that claims for back pay in employment discrimina-
tion cases traditionally were viewed as incidental because back
pay constitutes an equitable remedy. However, the kinds of com-
pensatory damages sought in Allison, by claimants alleging dis-
parate treatment in violation of the 1991 amendments to Title
VII, were clearly different, and not incidental damages.
Again, in reaching this conclusion, the court viewed the indi-
vidualized nature of each claimant's damages as fatal to the req-
uisite predominance requirement for determining damages to be
incidental: "The very nature of [compensatory] damages, compen-
sating plaintiffs for emotional and other intangible injuries, nec-
essarily implicates the subjective differences of each plaintiff's
circumstances.' 3
The consequences of the Allison principles can be somewhat
severe. If a court determines that a class plaintiff has improperly
pleaded an action that is predominantly for damages under the
23(b)(2) provision, the class may not be certified. The case either
may be dismissed outright, or remanded for a determination on
whether the class may proceed as a 23(b)(3) action.1 34 In Allison,
the Fifth Circuit found that the Title VII claims seeking compen-
satory, monetary relief could not be certified under a hybrid
23(b)(2)/(b)(3) combination approach. Finally, the court rejected
partial certification under the 23(b)(3) provision because the class
damage claims could not satisfy the additional requirements of
predominance and superiority, for a 23(b)(3) class.
b) Jefferson and the new hybrid class action. The Allison
decision, and its predominance test, effectively functions as an
on-off switch: if equitable relief predominates, the class may be
certified as a mandatory 23(b)(2) class, but if monetary damages
predominate, the class may not be certified as a 23(b)(2) class.
Under Allison, the pleader often is impaled on the predominance
irony: if monetary damages predominate to defeat certification
under the 23(b)(2) provision, then it is more likely than not that
the independent predominance requirement for the 23(b)(3) class
will not be satisfied. ' Thus, to prove predominance in the
"' 151 F3d at 417.
1:4 See, for example, Murray v Auslander, 244 F3d 807, 812-13 (11th Cir 2001) (reject-
ing a 23(b)(2) certification and remanding for consideration of a 23(b)(3) class certifica-
tion). See also Hoffman v Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc, 191 FRD 530, 531 n 4 (S
D Ohio 1999) (plaintiffs had not sought leave to replead damage action as a (b)(3) action).
135 See, for example, Osgood v Harrah's Entertainment, Inc, 202 FRD 115, 129-31 (D
NJ 2001).
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23(b)(2) class is to simultaneously defeat the predominance nec-
essary for the 23(b)(3) class.
The Seventh Circuit, in its Jefferson decision, sought to reject
these bright line rules and permit certification of both the equita-
ble and damage remedies, however pleaded. The court created
three possible options for handling such proposed classes. '36 First,
a court could certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for all proceed-
ings.1 31 Second, the court could approve a divided certification.13 1
Third, the court could certify a class under 23(b)(2) for both
monetary and equitable relief and then exercise its plenary au-
thority under Rule 23(d)(2) and (d)(5) to order notice and opt-out
allowances, as though the class were certified under the 23(b)(3)
provision. 9
Of the three possible options, the Seventh Circuit's sugges-
tion of the "hybrid" class action, that would embrace both types of
claims and remedies, has proved the most mischievous. However,
the Jefferson hybrid approach is a much more forgiving though
analytically incoherent approach to solving the problem of mixed
equitable and damage class actions.
The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing the Fifth Circuit's series of
Allison decisions, could not definitively determine whether the
Fifth Circuit authorized the possibility of split or partial class
certifications, but read the Fifth Circuit's order on the denial of
rehearing as suggesting the possibility for split classes.4 ' There-
fore, the Seventh Circuit stepped into this doctrinal void by ap-
proving just such combined, hybrid class certifications:
Divided certification is also worth consideration. It is pos-
sible to certify the injunctive aspects of the suit under
Rule 23(b)(2) and the damages aspects under Rule
23(b)(3), achieving both consistent treatment of class-wide
equitable relief and an opportunity for each affected per-
son to exercise control over the damages aspects.'
"7 See Lemon v International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No 139, AFL-CIO,
216 F3d 577, 581 (7th Cir 2000) (explaining Jefferson).
137 Id. See also Jefferson, 195 F3d at 899 (noting that if the district found that the
damages sought were more than incidental, it should certify the class under 23(b)(3)(b)).
"3 Lemon, 216 F3d at 581. See also Jefferson, 195 F3d at 898-99 (finding that "hybrid"
class as an option if the district court believed the damages sought were not incidental to
the equitable relief.).
13' Lemon, 216 F3d at 582. See also Jefferson, 185 F3d at 898.
Jefferson, 195 F3d at 898.
Id.
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In approving such hybrid class certifications, the Seventh
Circuit indicated that the Rule 23(b)(2) class could seek injunc-
tive relief, while the notice and opt out rights could be preserved
for the damages issues. Ironically, the Seventh Circuit based its
approval of the hybrid class action on its reading of the Ortiz de-
cision:
But no matter what the panel in Allison may have meant
by its order, the controlling authority today is Ortiz, which
says in no uncertain terms that class members' right to
notice and an opportunity to opt out should be preserved
whenever possible. It is possible to preserve those rights in
this case.'4 2
As indicated above, the possibility of the Jefferson hybrid op-
tion has had great appeal among class litigants. This approach is
not as draconian as the Allison principles, which often serve to
defeat class certification outright.
III. GAMING THE SYSTEM: THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
DOCTRINAL INCOHERENCE AND THE BLURRING OF CLASS
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES
As indicated above, courts progressively have engaged in a
kind of doctrinal drift among class categories. Thus, courts have
eroded or blurred principled distinctions among class categories
that used to embody meaningful distinctions and practical impli-
cations. The significance of this doctrinal drift has been to render
the separate class categories virtually meaningless, giving rise to
a kind of Uber-class that embraces all claims, remedies, and class
members.
As a consequence, practicing class action attorneys-who
read and pay attention to these decisions-have strategically de-
ployed this confused jurisprudence to great effect. In short, coun-
sel from both the plaintiffs' and defense bars have created argu-
ments and artful pleadings to exploit class action procedure, in
ways never intended by the rulemakers.
On the one hand, some may view these new creative ap-
proaches to class action procedure as evidence of the evolving
brilliance of the common law and the ready adaptability of the
practicing bar to new challenges. On the other hand, some may
142 Id at 898-99.
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view the blurring of class action categories, and the pleadings and
practice built upon this incoherence, as opportunistic gaming of
the judicial system. The following four illustrations explain the
ways in which class categories have been blurred, and the meth-
ods by which attorneys have adapted evolving jurisprudence to
achieve their litigation goals.
These illustrations proceed from a basic assumption that also
has evolved during the last decade. Since the mid-1990s, federal
courts have engaged in more rigorous scrutiny of motions for
class certification. As it has become increasingly difficult to pur-
sue and certify Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out classes, the plaintiffs' bar
has instead turned to pleading mandatory 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2)
classes for certification. Because the Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes do not need to meet the more stringent 23(b)(3) require-
ments of predominance and superiority, certification under the
mandatory classes is viewed as easier, and more desirable. Thus,
certification of a mandatory class will not incur the additional
expense of notice, or the complications of an opt-out procedure.
Somewhat similarly, the mandatory class categories have
enjoyed a resurgence of popularity among defense attorneys when
the proceedings are on the verge of settlement. While the defense
bar will aggressively defend against certification of litigation
classes, the preferred mode of class-wide settlement for defen-
dants is through a mandatory settlement class.
Thus, strategic pleading of mandatory classes has now be-
come the handmaiden of blurred class categories, which in turn is
aided and abetted by evolving jurisprudence.
A. Illustration 1: The New Hybrid Class Action
The Seventh Circuit's recognition and creation of the new
"hybrid" class in Jefferson seems to be one of the most insidious
inroads on clear thinking, let alone clear pleading. It is an open
invitation to game the system. The Jefferson option represents
the ultimate assault on distinct class action categories, and is a
boon to lazy, imprecise, or overly clever pleaders.
In essence, the Jefferson option permits the class action
plaintiff to plead a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class action that
also seeks damages, with the failsafe option in which the court
will create a combined 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) class to deal with and
encompass the different remedies that otherwise might not be
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permissible under a strictly-construed and rigorously-analyzed
23(b)(2) class.
There are a number of reasons why the Jefferson option is
highly advantageous to the plaintiffs' bar. Damage class actions
normally must be pleaded as 23(b)(3) opt-out classes, and must
meet the additional requirements of predominance and superior-
ity. To avoid the additional burdens of proof, class counsel post-
Jefferson may plead a damage action as a 23(b)(2) injunctive or
declaratory class, with an incidental request for damages. There
is no harm in so pleading, and in fact, there is great advantage.
In this scenario, there is no downside risk to the pleader for
the failure to clearly understand or define the true nature of the
claims and remedies. The pleader never has to fish or cut bait. If
the court determines that the class seeks a damage remedy that
is not available under the 23(b)(2) category, the court will "fix"
this problem by concurrently certifying both a 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)
action. This possibility rewards the lazy, imprecise, or overly
clever pleader, allows the plaintiff to have his cake and eat it too,
and puts the court in the role of pleading or redefining the class.
The Jefferson decision informs us that it is perfectly legiti-
mate to create and certify such "hybrid" 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)
classes. However, the Jefferson decision, and its progeny, have
provided little or no guidance concerning the actual implementa-
tion of such a hybrid class action. The Jefferson line of cases does
not inform us how notice is to be effectuated in a combined
23(b)(2) and (b)(3) class action. Will the class members for the
23(b)(2) and (b)(3) classes overlap, or not? Is notice only to be
given to the 23(b)(3) class? If the classes do overlap, will the
23(b)(3) notice to class members describe and inform class mem-
bers of the parallel 23(b)(2) class and relief?
The Jefferson line of cases similarly do not inform us how the
opt-out procedure will work in the new hybrid class action, which
is a problem tied to that of notice, and the possible overlapping
membership of the 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) classes. One may assume
that 23(b)(3) class members who receive notice will be informed of
their right to opt out; but what of 23(b)(2) class members, who
will have no such right? Will the 23(b)(2) class members receive
notice of the hybrid nature of the class, only to be informed that
they have no concomitant right to opt out? Can notice be drafted
that will be intelligible to all hybrid class members?
In addition, the Jefferson line of cases sheds absolutely no
light on how a Jefferson-style hybrid case is actually to be tried.
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The hybrid 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) class action raises Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial problems, requiring Beacon Thea-
tre sequential staging of legal and equitable claims. Yet the Jef-
ferson line of cases has not analytically progressed to the point of
considering how an actual hybrid class action would be staged,
and at what cost to litigant rights.
Finally, the Jefferson line of cases has also not considered the
claim-splitting, res judicata, or preclusive effects of hybrid class
actions that are certified as combined 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) class
actions. It is entirely possible that claims certified in a Jefferson
hybrid 23(b)(2) class could create a res judicata effect that would
not be cured by claims captured by the 23(b)(3) part of the action.
In other words, the mandatory nature of the 23(b)(2) part of the
class could serve as a bar to the pursuit of future claims, which
preclusive effect might not be ameliorated by the 23(b)(3) pres-
ence of an opt-out right.
While the possibility of the new Jefferson hybrid is plagued
with instrumental problems, it is more broadly objectionable be-
cause it blurs the distinction between classes that are wholly or
predominantly for compensatory damages, and those that are
not. The Jefferson hybrid effectively undercuts the Allison inquiry
of "predominance" for 23(b)(2) actions: predominance in the Alli-
son sense meaning whether damages or injunctive relief pre-
dominates in the action.
Lastly, the Jefferson hybrid also makes no sense in light of
the prevailing-and often quoted hornbook rule-that if a class
action is pleaded under multiple provisions of Rule 23, including
the 23(b)(3) provision, then the preference is to certify the class
under the 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) provision. What the Jefferson court
seems to be signaling is, if the plaintiff pleads his case under
multiple provisions of Rule 23, including the 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)
provisions, then the court can and should certify under them all.
B. Illustration 2: Recasting Damage Class Actions as Mandatory
Class Actions.
The second means by which litigants have exploited the
emerging jurisprudence of blurred class action categories occurs
when plaintiffs simply recast damage class actions as injunctive
or declaratory relief class actions. Hence, rather than pleading a
contract cause of action for damages under the 23(b)(3) provi-
sions, as such a class properly should be brought, class counsel
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instead will plead a 23(b)(2) claim for declaratory or injunctive
relief on the same contract claim. For example, on an alleged
breach of an insurance contract the plaintiff will ask the court for
an injunction requiring the defendant to interpret and apply pol-
icy terms in a certain way, or for a declaratory judgment declar-
ing that the ways in which a defendant has been acting violates
the contract. Sometimes the pleading of such 23(b)(2) claims will
be coupled with a request for "incidental damages," with the
pleader characterizing contract damages as incidental to the in-
junctive or declaratory relief.'
The obvious purpose of pleading what is properly a damage
class action as mandatory 23(b)(2) injunctive or declaratory relief
class is to avoid having to satisfy the additional 23(b)(3) certifica-
tion requirements of predominance and superiority. In the more
extreme versions of this type of strategic pleading, when plain-
tiffs' counsel become aware of the difficulties of satisfying the
predominance and superiority requirements for 23(b)(3) damage
classes, counsel begin to abandon legal claims and remedies
through successive amended pleadings.
In recent years, it has become common practice for class
counsel originally to plead a class complaint with multiple legal
claims and damages, but then use the liberal amendment provi-
sions to systematically strip the complaint of problematic legal
claims that cannot possibly satisfy the predominance and superi-
ority requirements.' In this scenario, a class action that starts
out as an opt-out class with multiple claims for damages is con-
verted into a mandatory, non-opt-out class seeking either de-
claratory or injunctive relief only.
The question is, can class counsel do this? There are counter-
vailing arguments that suggest that while various rules of civil
procedure may countenance such maneuvers, such strategic re-
casting of damage class actions seriously threatens the due proc-
ess concerns inherent in the class action rule. While plaintiffs'
attorneys laud such practices as effective representation, there
are several good reasons why the development of this trend is
particularly troubling in the class action context. And, to the ex-
113 This variation of artful pleading then brings the complaint within the purview of
the Allison/Jefferson body of cases.
14' This is a kind of class action version of the plaintiffs' lawyers throwing deck chairs
off the Titanic as the ship is going down. Often, the jettisoning of claims and legal reme-
dies is accompanied by successive re-definitions of the class itself, with the effect of throw-
ing class claimants overboard, as well.
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tent that courts have engaged in blurring class categories to the
point of rendering the class categories meaningless, the courts
have aided, abetted, and encouraged such pleading practices, as
well as due process violations.
Class counsel who engage in such strategic recasting of dam-
age class actions as mandatory 23(b)(2) actions make at least
three arguments. First, class counsel suggest that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require only notice pleading, and there-
fore class counsel is obligated only to provide notice of the action
at the outset of the litigation. Hence, as the class action pro-
gresses and discovery develops, class counsel subsequently may
discover that certain claims or remedies are not supported by the
facts.
The notice theory of federal pleading, in turn, supports class
counsel's second argument, which is that the federal rules pro-
vide for liberal amendment of pleadings and thus the systematic
jettisoning of claims, or the complete recasting of a complaint
from a 23(b)(3) class for legal damages to a 23(b)(2) mandatory
class for injunctive or declaratory relief. Thus, the plaintiffs' bar
argues that these techniques are entirely justified and supported
by the federal rules. The corollary to this argument, based on
widely practiced realities,145 is that it is not uncommon for class
counsel to amend a class complaint several times on the road to
class certification (and settlement), and that the class complaint
is a fluid document, subject to conditional and provisional certifi-
cation and revision, even by the court itself.
The third argument class counsel advance in support of re-
casting of damage class actions as mandatory 23(b)(2) classes is
that such strategic pleading and repleading is a good thing; in-
deed, it demonstrates the adequacy of class counsel in vigorously
representing the interests of class members in fashioning the
class complaint in a way that will support class certification.
Thus, to fail to amend a class complaint that includes legal dam-
age claims that cannot satisfy the predominance and superiority
requirements, does not serve the class well.
For the most part, courts have not seriously considered the
implications of the recent spate of strategic recasting of 23(b)(3)
damage class actions as 23(b)(2) mandatory classes. The trend
' This is the "everyone does it so it must be right" theory. The argument is typically
based on plaintiffs' counsel's assertions that multiple amendments to class complaints are
a very common practice, that everyone (including the courts) knows and accepts the prac-
tice.
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among courts has been simply to ratify such maneuvers, or to
look the other way-to the extent the court is even aware of the
strategic pleading. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' arguments in
support of recasting 23(b)(3) damage class actions as mandatory
23(b)(2) injunctive or declaratory relief classes, courts should
more rigorously analyze and consider the development of the
class pleadings and the totality of the action, rather than what-
ever amended pleading is last furnished to the court in isolation.
There are several rule-based, as well as due process and fairness
concerns, that impel such vigorous scrutiny of artful pleading of
class complaints.
First, courts generally should bring more rigorous scrutiny,
analysis, and considered jurisprudence to the problem of multi-
ple, repetitive class action pleadings. In current practice, it is not
uncommon for class counsel to endlessly submit multiple
amended class action complaints to the court, up to and after the
class certification hearing. This makes the class action a kind of
moving, variable target. In the class action universe, the class
complaint is tantamount to an evolving work of art, somewhat
like an unfinished symphony or an incomplete Renaissance paint-
ing that is perpetually subject to further touching up, even centu-
ries later. There is something seriously wrong when a court per-
mits the submission of fourteen amended complaints in the same
class action.146
Typically in class action practice the submission of multiple,
successive amended complaints is not based on the discovery of
new facts or evidence. Rather, class counsel file amended com-
plaints when counsel become aware that there are problems with
the class definition, or that the legal claims and remedies they
have pleaded will be exceedingly difficult to certify as a 23(b)(3)
damage action because of lack of predominance or superiority.
Class counsels' realization of such problems usually are in re-
sponse to the defendants' pleadings or motions.
Indeed, the defense bar plays the unusual role of educating
the plaintiff concerning defects in the class pleading, and each
successive round of filings prior to certification inspires the filing
of an amended class complaint. Class complaints undergo a
highly predictable metamorphosis. Thus, through successive
rounds of pleading, class counsel tend to narrow the class defini-
"' I have worked on just such a class action in the Texas state courts. See Farmers
Insurance Exchange v Leonard, 2003 WL 1831928 (Tex App).
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tion, eliminate claimants or entire categories of claimants, reduce
nationwide classes down to statewide classes, and eliminate mul-
tiple claims and remedies. It is not unusual, over multiple class
complaints, for class counsel to abandon a nationwide class of
claimants in a twelve count damage action, in favor of a state-
based class only seeking a declaratory judgment. At some point-
even in the class action context-there must be some serious,
principled limits even to the notion of liberal amendment of
pleadings.
While class counsel characterize such conduct as constituting
effective representation, courts ought to recognize this behavior
for what it is: the object of this exercise is not to serve the inter-
ests of class members, but rather to serve the interests of class
counsel. Thus, class counsel game the liberal system created by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, extrapolated onto class ac-
tion practice. Hence, class counsel creatively invoke both notice
pleading and the liberal amendment policy to justify abandoning
class members' interests in their own self-interests, and to right-
eously justify the crafting or distilling of the narrowest possible
class that is certifiable under Rule 23.
Second, courts have uncritically accepted the idea that class
counsel can simply re-plead any 23(b)(3) legal damage claim as a
23(b)(2) action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. This
is wrong, and a misuse of the declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief action. Neither declaratory judgments nor injunctions
were intended to provide judicial determinations on ultimate li-
ability issues.
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon to see class complaints in
which the legal liability theory is simply asserted as, or converted
into, a request for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. Thus,
class counsel may take a breach of contract claim and recast the
class complaint as a request for a declaration from the court that
the defendants have breached the contract. There are endless
variations on this theme over an array of legal theories sounding
in tort, contract, and statutory claims. As my colleague Professor
Redish rightly suggests, the class action rule, as a procedural
form or mechanism, was never intended to alter substantive law.
The class action rule cannot possibly be used to modify the con-
cepts underlying the appropriate use of the declaratory judgment
action or injunctive relief.
Third, class counsel should not be permitted to avoid the ad-
ditional requirements of predominance and superiority simply by
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the expedient of converting a 23(b)(3) damage claim into a man-
datory 23(b)(2) declaratory judgment or injunctive relief action.
Mandatory classes require cohesion among class members,'47 and
plaintiffs cannot manufacture the requisite cohesion by convert-
ing a heterogeneous damage class action into a declaratory judg-
ment action. A class that could not otherwise be certified as a
23(b)(3) damage class because of lack of predominance and supe-
riority ought not to be certifiable as 23(b)(2) action simply by re-
pleading it as something else.' In such instances, courts ought to
seriously "pierce the veil" of the 23(b)(2) pleading to discern the
true nature of the case.
14 9
Fourth, the strategic pleading of a 23(b)(3) damage class ac-
tion as a 23(b)(2) mandatory action invariably raises serious res
judicata, claim-splitting problems, where the only relief sought is
a declaratory judgment or injunction. The conventional under-
standing of res judicata principles requires a claimant to bring all
claims that the pleader could have, or should have, brought in the
first action. The prohibition against claim splitting will bar a
claimant from subsequently pursuing claims not brought in the
first action. The res judicata problem obviously is exacerbated
when class counsel plead a mandatory 23(b)(2) action, which does
not permit a class claimant to opt out and therefore avoid any
possible res judicata bar.
Hence, when class counsel strategically plead (or re-plead) a
damage class action as a declaratory judgment action, the class
may win the declaratory judgment, but the effect of that judg-
ment may bar class claimants from pursuing relief under legal
theories that class counsel abandoned in favor of the 23(b)(2)
class. The potential res judicata effects of the mandatory class
action are even more insidious in the scenario where class coun-
sel originally pleads multiple legal claims and damages, only to
abandon all those claims and damages in favor of a narrow de-
claratory judgment action. In such cases, the pleadings them-
selves make manifest the array of claims that could have or
should have been pursued in the action, but were instead jetti-
soned in favor of the expediency of narrowing the complaint to
"' See Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc v McManus, 320 F3d 545, 552-53 (5th Cir 2003).
See also Tracker Marine v Ogle, 2003 WL 1833140 (Tex App).
"' This has indeed been the chief reason why courts have rejected certification of
numerous proposed medical monitoring classes. See Part III C.
' General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 160 (1982) (allowing
courts to probe behind the pleadings when necessary to make an informed certification
decision.)
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the smallest possible acceptable unit that a court may reasonably
certify.
Fifth, the strategic pleading or re-pleading of a 23(b)(3) dam-
age class action as 23(b)(2) declaratory or injunctive relief class
creates a Shutts problem in nationwide or multistate action, es-
pecially where class counsel "incidentally" seek damages. This
scenario directly implicates the due process problem inherent in
Shutts footnote 3. Because class members cannot opt out, they
cannot give consent by virtue of their failure to exclude them-
selves from the class.
Finally, the pleading or re-pleading of a 23(b)(3) damage
class as a mandatory 23(b)(2) class raises problems concerning
the adequacy of both the class representative and class counsel.
Regarding the class representative, class complaints often plead
individual claims on behalf of the class representative, as well as
class claims on behalf of the class. When class counsel amend a
class complaint to recast a 23(b)(3) damage class as a mandatory
23(b)(2) declaratory judgment or injunctive class, but the repre-
sentative retains all individual claims, this creates a conflict of
interest between the class representative and the class members.
In this scenario the class representative will be able to pur-
sue all individual claims in addition to the class 23(b)(2) claim,
and will have the opportunity to be afforded relief different from,
and in addition to, that of the class members. Moreover, the class
representative will not suffer the consequences of a possible res
judicata bar of such individual claims, which the mandatory class
sacrifices for class members.
Regarding class counsel, arguably the jettisoning of 23(b)(3)
legal claims and damages embodies the self-serving interests of
class counsel, rather than the vigorous protection of class mem-
bers' interests. This strategic pleading is especially suspect when
class counsel narrows the class definition, abandons large seg-
ments of a previously represented class, abandons a long laundry
list of legal claims and damages, and re-tailors the complaint to
state solely an action for declaratory relief. In such actions, class
members stand to recover a declaration from the court, but noth-
ing else. Class counsel stand to benefit from some formulation of
negotiated attorneys' fees.
Hence, courts should be encouraged to more carefully evalu-
ate the nature and context of plaintiffs' strategic pleading, espe-
cially in the class action context. The ordinary rules relating to
notice pleading and liberal amendments may have some rele-
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vance in the class action context, but the way in which these
rules are deployed in the class action context cannot possibly be
the same because of the due process underpinnings of class litiga-
tion.
Class counsel's invocation of the liberal amendment rule is
an excellent example of how application of this principle in the
class action context can undermine the due process rights of ab-
sent class members. In ordinary, two-party litigation, a plaintiff's
rights are not sacrificed when the plaintiff can confer with coun-
sel on the decision whether to pursue or abandon legal claims,
theories, or remedies. It is something else, however, in a class
action, for class counsel to successively amend a class complaint
several times to eliminate large numbers of class members,
claims, and remedies. In this instance, absent class members
have no knowledge that their legal representatives-both the des-
ignated class representative and class counsel-are jettisoning
their legal rights in the interests of obtaining any class certifica-
tion of a narrow class that may not redound to the class members'
benefit and may even be detrimental.
C. Illustration 3: Inventing New Claims for Mandatory Class
Treatment: The Medical Monitoring Example
Perhaps one of the most graphic illustrations of class action
category blurring has occurred during the past decade with the
development of jurisprudence relating to medical monitoring
classes.5 ° In this arena, both plaintiffs as well as defense attor-
neys have strategically deployed the class action categories, ei-
ther to seek or defeat class certification. And, both plaintiffs and
defense counsel have massaged the concepts, and terminology, of
cohesion, predominance, and superiority, to interesting ends.
The era of mass tort litigation has largely been responsible
for the creation of the "medical monitoring" class. One explana-
tion for the development of the medical monitoring phenomenon
is that medical monitoring claims are the result of the increased
difficulty in certifying mass tort litigation classes in federal
court."' During the mid-1990s, as federal courts frequently de-
" The following discussion is adapted, in part, from Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Liti-
gation Medical Monitoring, Nat] L J B17 (March 29, 1999).
"' Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734 (5th Cir 1996) (reversing certification
of a mass tort class because of variance in state laws and individual plaintiffs claims);
Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293 (7th Cir 1995) (declining to certify a class
because of a belief that the threat of class litigation would coerce the defendants to settle).
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nied or reversed certifications of various proposed nationwide
mass tort litigation classes, plaintiffs' counsel regrouped and de-
veloped the theory of the medical monitoring class. Class com-
plaints for medical monitoring increasingly appeared on the liti-
gation landscape. In turn, the demand for medical monitoring
classes in mass tort cases inspired a body of unsettled, perplexing
law that dramatically embodies the blurring of class categories
and concepts.
Plaintiffs typically seek certification of a medical monitoring
class when claimants have been exposed to a toxic substance or
have used a medical device, but may not manifest a medical con-
dition until years later. Plaintiffs have sought medical monitoring
in various mass tort cases, including cases of exposure to radioac-
tive nuclear substances, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), asbes-
tos, lead paint, and chemical contamination. Plaintiffs also have
sought medical monitoring in actions related to heart valves,
pacemakers, and tampons. In seeking a medical monitoring class,
plaintiffs request that the defendant create a fund to bear the
expense of future medical monitoring of class members' condi-
tions.
The medical monitoring class, however, has carved out an
unusual jurisprudential niche, roosting uneasily between sub-
stantive and procedural law. Thus, courts have disagreed over
whether medical monitoring actions present a substantive legal
claim, a request for equitable relief, or merely embody a proce-
dural device or administrative mechanism. Because medical
monitoring classes involve a fund, courts have reached different
conclusions on whether medical monitoring classes seek equitable
or legal relief. Additionally, because medical monitoring classes
embody a hybrid of legal and equitable elements, such classes
implicate difficult Seventh Amendment right to jury problems,
concerning the staging of a class action trial involving both legal
and equitable claims, or whether the claimants are entitled to a
jury trial at all.
Medical monitoring class actions are a relatively new and
recent phenomenon that has engendered a body of unsettled and
perplexing law. There is no general trend among federal or state
courts favoring certification of medical monitoring classes. On the
contrary, medical monitoring classes present a novel form of ac-
tion entailing substantive and procedural difficulties, and courts
disagree whether such classes should be certified. Courts that
have addressed medical monitoring have taken a cautious ap-
226 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2003:
proach to such proposed classes, and in the majority of cases,
courts generally have refused to certify such classes,12 have re-
jected such classes on motions to dismiss..3 or at summary judg-
ment,' or have reversed certifications. 5 5
Courts disagree whether medical monitoring cases present a
substantive legal claim, a means to equitable relief, a procedural
device, or an administrative mechanism." 6 Plaintiffs usually seek
certification of a medical monitoring class under Rule 23(b)(2) or
its state equivalent, the class action category for injunctive or
declaratory relief. However, because medical monitoring classes
typically involve creation of a fund, courts have reached different
conclusions on whether medical monitoring classes constitute
equitable or legal relief."7
In a seminal decision concerning medical monitoring claims,
Judge S. Arthur Spiegel, of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, explained that a medical monitor-
ing claim may be satisfied in different ways."' For example, a
court may order a defendant to pay the plaintiffs money, and the
plaintiffs may or may not choose to use the money to have their
medical condition monitored. Alternatively, a court might order
the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' medical expenses directly, so
152 See, for example, Zinser v Accuftx Research Institute, Inc, 253 F3d 1180 (9th Cir
2001) (affirming denial of class certification); Boughton v Cotter Corp, 65 F3d 823 (10th
Cir 1995) (affirming denial of class certification in a case involving claims of exposure to
hazardous emissions from a uranium mill); Badillo v The American Tobacco Co, 202 FRD
261, 265 (D Nev 2001) (class certification denied); Guillory v The American Tobacco Co,
2001 WL 290603 (N D Ill) (class certification denied); O'Connor v Boeing North American,
Inc, 197 FRD 404 (C D Cal 2000) (class certification denied); Harding v Tambrands, Inc,
165 FRD 623 (D Kan 1996) (class certification denied); Thomas v FAG Bearings Corp, 846
F Supp 1400, 1410 (W D Mo 1994) (class certification denied).
" See, for example, Trimble v Asarco, Inc, 232 F3d 946 (8th Cir 2000) (affirming
grant of motion to dismiss medical monitoring class); Hinton v Monsanto Co, 2001 WL
1073699 (Ala) (granting motion to dismiss medical monitoring class); Badillo v American
Brands, Inc, 2001 WL 79884 (Nev) (granting motion to dismiss medical monitoring class);
McGeehan v Becton-Dickinson & Co, 2000 WL 33128993 (Pa Coin P1) (same).
" See, for example, In re Marine Asbestos Cases, 2001 WL 1028293 (9th Cir) (affirm-
ing grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment on medical monitoring class);
Abuan v General Electric Co, 3 F3d 329 (9th Cir 1993) (affirming grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment on medical monitoring class); In re Paoli Railroad Yard
PCB Litigation, 2000 WL 1279922 (E D Pa) (granting defendant's summary judgment
motion on medical monitoring class); Purjet v Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp, 1986 WL 1200
(D VI) (same); Bowerman v United Illuminating, 1998 WL 910271 (Conn Super 1998)
(same).
" See, for example, In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc, 221 F3d 870 (6th Cir 2000)
(reversing class certification).
" Mullenix, Natl L J at B17 (cited in note 150).
17 Id.
" See Day v NLO Inc, 144 FRD 330, 335-36 (S D Ohio 1992).
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that the plaintiffs might be monitored by a physician of the plain-
tiffs' choice. Neither of these forms of relief constitutes equitable
or injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2).
If, however, the court established a medical monitoring pro-
gram of its own, financed by the defendant but managed by court-
appointed or supervised trustees, in which the plaintiffs were
monitored by particular physicians and medical data were used
for group studies, this program would constitute injunctive relief
under Rule 23(b)(2). Thus, the use of a medical monitoring fund
to administer medical surveillance payments would be an exer-
cise of the court's equitable powers."9 In the wake of Judge
Spiegel's distinction in Day v NLO,"' federal courts have indi-
cated that the dispositive factor in assessing whether a medical
monitoring claim can be certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class is to de-
termine what type of relief the plaintiffs actually are seeking.
Thus:
[i]f plaintiffs seek relief that is a disguised request for
compensatory damages, then the medical monitoring
claim can only be characterized as a claim for monetary
damages. In contrast, if plaintiffs seek the establishment
of a court-supervised medical monitoring program through
which the class members will receive periodic examina-
tions, then the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim can be
properly characterized as a claim seeking injunctive re-
lief.'
Whether proponents may seek certification of a medical
monitoring class depends on whether the state recognizes a claim
for medical monitoring. The possibility for the establishment of a
medical monitoring class differs greatly among state and federal
courts. At the threshold, state and federal courts disagree about
whether plaintiffs seeking a medical monitoring class must estab-
lish physical injuries in order to certify a medical monitoring
class. Several states, such as California, Louisiana, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Utah have recognized recovery for medical
monitoring in the absence of physical injury. Some federal courts,
predicting state law-for example, in Colorado-have reached the
159 Id.
'60 144 FRD 330 (SD Ohio 1992).
' Barnes v American Tobacco Co, Inc, 989 F Supp 661, 665 (E D Pa 1997). But see
Barnes v American Tobacco Co, Inc, 161 F3d 127, 146 (3d Cir 1998) (affirming decertifica-
tion of medical monitoring class).
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same conclusion. Other federal courts, however, construing Vir-
ginia and West Virginia law, have held that medical monitoring
expenses are only available if a plaintiff has sustained a physical
injury.62
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has led the way among
states in setting forth the elements for stating a claim for medical
monitoring."' Pennsylvania's standards have been repeated in
modified forms in other states that have recognized a claim for
medical monitoring. Hence, in order for a court to certify a medi-
cal monitoring class, a plaintiff must show: (1) that exposure ex-
ceeds normal background levels; (2) that the substance in ques-
tion has been proven hazardous; (3) that the exposure was caused
by the defendant's negligence; (4) that as a proximate result of
the exposure, the plaintiffs' risk of contracting a serious latent
disease has significantly increased; (5) that a monitoring proce-
dure exists to make early detection of the disease possible; (6)
that the prescribed monitoring regime is different from that nor-
mally recommended in the absence of the exposure; and (7) that
the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary accord-
ing to contemporary scientific principles.
64
Similarly, Florida courts have recognized that a trial court
may use its equitable powers to create and supervise a fund for
medical monitoring purposes if the plaintiff proves the following
elements: (1) exposure greater than normal background levels; (2)
to a proven hazardous substance; (3) caused by the defendant's
negligence; (4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has
a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent dis-
ease; (5) a monitoring program procedure exists that makes the
early detection of the disease possible; (6) the prescribed monitor-
161 See Ball v Joy Technologies, Inc, 958 F2d 36, 38-39 (4th Cir 1991). See also Werlein
v US, 746 F Supp 887, 904 (D Minn 1990).
' Redland Soccer Club Inc v Department of the Army, 696 A2d 137, 144-46 (Pa 1997).
' Id. The Redland court also indicated four policy reasons for recognizing a cause of
action for medical monitoring. First, medical monitoring promotes the "early diagnosis
and treatment of disease" resulting from exposure caused by a tortfeasor's negligence.
Second, "[aillowing recovery for such expenses avoids the potential injustice of forcing an
economically disadvantaged person to pay for expensive diagnostic examinations necessi-
tated by another's negligence" and "affords toxic-tort victims, for whom other sorts of
recovery may prove difficult, immediate compensation for medical monitoring needed as a
result of exposure." Third, medical monitoring "furthers the deterrent function of the tort
system by compelling those who expose others to toxic substances to minimize risks and
costs of exposure." Finally, medical monitoring is in harmony with "the important public
health interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to
toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease." Id at 145 (quoting Hansen v Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Co, 858 P2d 970, 976-77 (Utah 1993)).
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ing regime is different from that normally recommended in the
absence of the exposure; and (7) the prescribed monitoring regime
is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific prin-
ciples.165
In Pennsylvania, Florida, and other states, the criteria for
establishing a medical monitoring claim incorporate elements of
common law negligence. Generally, courts have rejected attempts
to certify medical monitoring classes where the medical monitor-
ing class is merely a disguised attempt to seek legal relief, be-
cause medical monitoring closely resembles a negligence-based
claim for future medical expenses. If a medical monitoring class
is merely a disguised attempt to recover compensatory damages,
then courts have held that certification of such a proposed class is
not permissible under Rule 23(b)(2), or analogous state provi-
sions."'
In considering whether to certify a proposed medical monitor-
ing class, federal and state courts have required the proponents
to demonstrate that the proposed class satisfies the threshold
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and ade-
quacy. If the threshold requirements are satisfied, then the class
proponents must demonstrate that the proposed class may be
maintained under one or more of the 23(b) categories.
However, when plaintiffs seek to certify a medical monitoring
class under the 23(b)(2) provision, class proponents must demon-
strate that the members of the class share the requisite cohesive-
ness and homogeneity required for mandatory 23(b)(2) class ac-
tions. The plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating the req-
uisite class cohesiveness among claimants, and the presence of
individualized facts, claims, and defenses will serve to undermine
and defeat certifiability.
In this fashion, the cohesiveness requirement for proposed
23(b)(2) medical monitoring classes has come to mimic the pre-
dominance requirement for 23(b)(3) classes: hence, the array of
factors that will defeat the predominance for a 23(b)(3) class will
now serve to defeat the cohesiveness requirement for a proposed
23(b)(2) medical monitoring class.
'" Petito v A.H. Robins Co, Inc, 750 So2d 103, 106-07 (Fla App 1999), citing Barnes v
The American Tobacco Co, 161 F3d 127, 138-39 (3d Cir 1998) (quoting Redland).
l' Mullenix, Natl L J at B17 (cited in note 153). See also Zinser v Accuftx Research
Institute, Inc, 253 F3d 1180, 1195-96 (9th Cir 2001); Dhamer v Bristol-Myers Squibb Co,
183 FRD 520, 528-29 (N D Ill 1998); Cook v Rockwell International Corp, 181 FRD 473,
480 (D Colo 1998).
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Alternatively, in those cases where plaintiffs have sought to
certify a 23(b)(3) medical monitoring class, the proponents must
demonstrate that common questions predominate and that a
class action is a superior means for resolving the dispute. Again,
the presence of individualized facts or issues undermines the
necessary requirements for predominance and superiority in a
23(b)(3) class.
The general class action principles of cohesiveness of a
23(b)(2) class, and predominance and superiority for a 23(b)(3)
class, apply with equal force to proposed medical monitoring
classes. In addition, in order to satisfy the rigorous analysis test,
the court must examine the underlying substantive law that con-
stitutes a medical monitoring claim. Hence, the proponents must
demonstrate to the court that the various elements that consti-
tute a medical monitoring claim may be tried and proven on a
class-wide basis. To the extent that the medical monitoring claim
includes a factor sounding in common law negligence, this may
also serve to undermine certifiability.
A further complicating issue in medical monitoring classes is
whether such claims require a jury trial. Under prevailing Sev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence, if a medical monitoring claim is
deemed equitable in nature, then there is no right to a jury trial.
On the contrary, if the medical monitoring claim is deemed legal,
then the defendant is entitled to a jury trial.
Because classes typically seek to certify medical monitoring
claims under Rule 23(b)(2), it would seem that such claims would
not go to the jury, but some federal courts have concluded other-
wise. Thus, several federal courts have indicated that a jury must
determine the issue of liability or the plaintiffs' need for medical
monitoring.'67 As the theory of medical monitoring claims has de-
veloped, the medical monitoring class has come to present a vex-
ing conundrum. The way in which a plaintiff pleads the medical
monitoring claim often is critical to class certification.
If the plaintiffs seek a lump sum award for the medical moni-
toring claim, then the class would be barred from seeking injunc-
tive relief. In theory, the plaintiffs have an alternative adequate
remedy at law-the lump sum of compensatory damages to pay
for future medical expenses. If the plaintiffs seek relief in the
167 See, for example, In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F3d 717, 795 (3d Cir
1994); Herber v Johns-Manville Corp, 785 F2d 79, 83 (3d Cir 1986); Fried v Sungard Re-
covery Services Inc, 925 F Supp 372, 374 (E D Pa 1996) (reserving the power to structure
the medical monitoring fund); Day v NLO Inc, 851 F Supp 869 (S D Ohio 1994).
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form of a medical monitoring fund, however, such a remedy in-
vokes the equitable powers of the court, and a plaintiff is not re-
quired to show an inadequate remedy at law.
In analyzing the tension between the Seventh Amendment
and Rule 23(b)(2) medical monitoring classes, a Pennsylvania
district court-in a tobacco medical monitoring class subse-
quently decertified-held that "the nature of the relief sought
under plaintiffs' medical monitoring fund, for the purposes of the
Seventh Amendment analysis, is inherently both legal and equi-
table."68 The court, citing Dairy Queen Inc v Wood,'69 concluded
that the constitutional right to a jury trial could not be made to
depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings. The court
reconciled the apparent conflict between a Rule 23(b)(2) equitable
medical monitoring class and providing a jury trial:
Thus, in order to establish a right to a Rule 23(b)(2) certi-
fication, it need only be shown that the relief requested is
not predominantly for damages. This inquiry has nothing
to do with whether one's constitutional right to a jury trial
has been implicated by the underlying nature of the claim.
Indeed, the bar for determining whether the nature of a
claim is equitable or legal for Seventh Amendment pur-
poses is much higher than it is under Rule 23(b)(2) analy-
Si.170sis. 17
In the court's view,
[ulnder Seventh Amendment analysis, the right to a jury
trial must be upheld even if the legal issues are character-
ized as 'incidental' to equitable issues .... For this reason,
decisions holding that medical monitoring claims may be
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are not dispositive for pur-
poses of the right to a jury trial. In theory and practice,
courts can certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and yet
find the parties are entitled to a jury under the Seventh
Amendment.
1 71
The development of the medical monitoring class has accom-
panied and paralleled the general blurring of class categories
Barnes, 989 F Supp at 668.
369 US 469 (1962).
170 Barnes, 989 F Supp at 668.
171 Id.
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during the past decade. The novel theory of the medical monitor-
ing class, and the doctrinal confusion it has inspired, has fostered
interesting strategic pleading by both plaintiffs' and defense
counsel. The illustration of the medical monitoring class also
demonstrates the synergy between judicial decisions and the
plaintiffs' and defense bars' ability to adapt litigation strategy in
an ever-changing legal environment.
Hence, in the seminal days of medical monitoring class com-
plaints, plaintiffs originally sought certification of medical moni-
toring classes under both the 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) categories. The
courts quickly rejected the possibility of certifying medical moni-
toring classes under the 23(b)(3) provision, because these medical
monitoring classes were viewed as disguised attempts to receive
damages, or because the proposed 23(b)(3) medical monitoring
classes were infused with individualized facts and issues that
defeated predominance. Defendants, of course, exploited the
23(b)(3) predominance and superiority requirements to defeat
proposed 23(b)(3) medical monitoring classes, successfully argu-
ing on the same grounds that defendants have used to defeat
mass tort litigation classes.
As plaintiffs' counsel became increasingly aware of the lack
of viability of certifying medical monitoring classes under the
23(b)(3) provision, the plaintiffs' bar regrouped and creatively
recast medical monitoring classes under the 23(b)(2) provision.
Courts next rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to repackage 23(b)(3)
medical monitoring classes as 23(b)(2) equitable classes, holding
that many of these proposed medical monitoring classes were ac-
tually damage class actions in disguise. At this juncture, plain-
tiffs' class counsel again regrouped, and learned to carefully plead
medical monitoring actions to seek only a "court supervised
fund," and no other form of relief.
Although the plaintiffs-at this juncture-seemed to have
resolved the conundrum of the medical monitoring action by pre-
cise pleading under the 23(b)(2) provision, the defense bar re-
sponded by breathing new life into the concepts of homogeneity
and cohesion. Hence, the defense bar resuscitated the fundamen-
tal principle that the mandatory 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions
require homogeneity and cohesion among class members, in order
for a court to sustain a proposed class under these mandatory
categories. In revitalizing this fundamental categorical impera-
tive, the defense bar successfully re-introduced, in mirror image,
the 23(b)(3) concept of lack of predominance back into the 23(b)(2)
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analysis. Thus, the defense bar has been able to defeat class certi-
fication of proposed 23(b)(2) medical monitoring classes for the
same array of arguments that have defeated proposed 23(b)(3)
mass tort litigation classes.
D. Illustration 4: Using the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) Class for
Compensatory Damages
The fourth and final illustration of class category blurring
that has evolved, to unfortunate effects, stems from a peculiarity
among state jurisdictions that permit damage class actions under
the 23(b)(1)(A) provision. Since my state of Texas currently per-
mits this, my discussion of this problem is based on Texas juris-
prudence.'72
The endorsement of the 23(b)(1)(A) damage class action truly
embodies the complete blurring of class categories and a total
judicial disregard for the basis, meaning, rationale, and due proc-
ess concerns that animated the creation of different class catego-
ries. Once courts have moved to the position of endorsing non-opt-
out damage class actions under the 23(b)(1)(A) provision, it
hardly can be argued that any meaningful distinctions remain
among class categories. Under these circumstances, one might
well then ask what useful purpose the 23(b) class categories
serve, and why litigants are put through the exercise of pleading
and supporting certification of a proposed action under the class
categories. Ultimately, however, the consequences for class
claimants of a 23(b)(1)(A) class action are severe.
Since the amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
in 1966, federal courts generally have not construed Rule
23(b)(1)(A) to permit federal courts to certify damage class ac-
tions under the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) provision.173 The U.S. Supreme
Court has acknowledged that Rule 23(b)(1)(A):
takes in cases where the party is obliged by law to treat
the members of the class alike (a utility acting toward cus-
tomers; a government imposing a tax), or where the party
,' It may well be that Texas is anomalous in permitting certification of 23(b)(1)(A)
damage class actions, but Texas is an important jurisdiction regarding the development of
state class action jurisprudence. The Texas anomaly, as such, serves as a useful illustra-
tion of the problem of class category confusion.
,' See generally Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1773 at
427 (cited in note 18).
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must treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity (a ri-
parian owner using water as against downriver owners). 74
Both the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 and numerous
federal decisions since 1966 provide examples of situations that
the rule drafters contemplated for class certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(A). These authorities indicate that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was
intended to be applied to a very narrow, limited set of circum-
stances, and not more broadly to any damage classes.
The Advisory Committee Note sets forth six illustrations of
when a 23(b)(1)(A) class certification is appropriate. Four of the
illustrations involve citizen actions against a municipality. The
first concerns an action against a municipality to declare a bond
issue invalid. The second deals with an action against a munici-
pality to condition or limit a bond issue. The third concerns an
action against a municipality to prevent or limit the municipality
in making a particular appropriation. The fourth addresses an
action against a municipality to compel or invalidate an assess-
ment. The Advisory Note's fifth illustration relates to the possi-
bility of "individual litigations of the rights and duties of riparian
owners." The Advisory Committee's sixth example of suitable cer-
tification under 23(b)(1)(A) involves "landowners' rights and du-
ties respecting a claimed nuisance."7 '
Since 1966, federal class action decisions consistently have
applied the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) category only in a narrow set of cir-
cumstances contemplated by the rule revisers. More importantly,
the federal cases clearly establish the principle that the mere fact
that one lawsuit may result in one judgment and another suit
may result in a different judgment, is insufficient to sustain class
certification under 23(b)(1)(A).176
Federal courts consistently have held that it is inappropriate
to certify damage class actions under the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) provi-
17' Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 614 (1997), quoting Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1996 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1), 81 Harv L Rev 356, 388 (1967).
17 See FRCP 23(b)(1)(A), Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendments, Subdivision
(b)(1).
17 See In re Dennis Greenman Securities Litigation, 829 F2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir
1987); In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F2d 300, 305 (6th Cir 1984);
McDonnell-Douglas Corp v US Dist Court for Central District of California, 523 F2d 1083,
1086 (9th Cir 1975); La Mar v H & B Novelty & Loan Co, 489 F2d 461, 466 (9th Cir 1973).
See also James Win. Moore, et al, 5 Moore's Federal Practice §23.41[2] [a] (Matthew Bender
3d ed 2003).
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sion.'" The reason why courts have declined to certify damage
class actions under the 23(b)(1)(A) provision is simple: the courts
have recognized that the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class is not intended to
encompass situations where a defendant may be found liable to
one plaintiff, but not to another. In addition, the fact that sepa-
rate actions would raise the same questions of law is not suffi-
cient to warrant certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 8
Currently there is a split among Texas courts as to the
proper application of the Rule 42(b)(1)(A) category.179 Three Texas
courts have accepted the federal interpretation of 23(b)(1)(A)
classes"'° in analyzing 42(b)(1)(A), and four Texas courts have re-
jected it."' The appellate courts that have correctly construed and
applied the Texas Rule 42(b)(1)(A) class category have indicated,
noting federal authority, that Federal Rule 23(b)(1)(A)-the fed-
eral counterpart to Texas's Rule 42(b)(1)(A)---"will ordinarily be
inappropriate in an action for damages."82 One of the Texas state
courts that has correctly construed 42(b)(1)(A) has stated: "When
the only risk is that some plaintiffs may win while others may
lose on identical facts, the problem of inconsistent or varying ad-
judications is not raised."183
Nonetheless, several Texas appellate courts have rejected the
federal jurisprudence regarding (b)(1)(A) class actions, and have
permitted (b)(1)(A) damage classes. These jurisdictions believe
the Texas approach provides "the better Texas rule"W84 on (b)(1)(A)
classes. The Texas Supreme Court has yet to consider the nature,
... See Dennis Greenman, 829 F2d at 1545; Bendectin Products, 749 F2d at 305. See
also Moore, et al, 5 Moore's Federal Practice §23.4115][a] (cited in note 176); Wright,
Miller, and Kane, 7 Federal Practice and Procedure, §1773 at 427 (cited in note 18).
178 See McDonnell-Douglas Corp, 523 F2d at 1086.
Tex R Civ P 42(b)(1)(A).
See American National Insurance Co v Cannon, 86 SW3d 801, 810 (Tex App 2002)(certification under Tex R Civ P 42(b)(1)(A) inappropriate where enforcement of agree-
ment depended on varying circumstances and merits of each potential class member's
case); Peltier Enterprises Inc v Hilton, 51 SW3d 616, 625 (Tex App 2001) (decertifying
inappropriately certified 42(b)(1)(A) class as not meeting the standard for certification); St.
Louis Southwestern Railway Co v Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc, 929 SW2d 25, 32
(Tex App 1996).
181 See FirstCollect, Inc v Armstrong, 976 SW2d 294, 302-03 (Tex App 1998); Reserve
Life Ins Co v Kirkland, 917 SW2d 836, 845 (Tex App 1996); Morgan v John Deere Credit,
Inc, 889 SW2d 360, 368-69 (Tex App 1994); Adams v Reagan, 791 SW2d 284, 292-93 (Tex
App 1990).
182 Green v Occidental Petroleum Corp, 541 F2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir 1976).
' St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 929 SW2d at 32, citing Bendectin Products, 749
F2d at 306.
" Reserve Life Insurance Co, 917 SW2d at 845.
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scope, and extent of the Texas Rule 42(b)(1)(A) class action, 8 or
the apparent conflict among the Texas appellate courts concern-
ing the appropriate use of the 42(b)(1)(A) class category.
The Texas state courts that have rejected the federal juris-
prudence animating the (b)(1)(A) class category have done so
based on one appellate court's misreading of the purpose and in-
tent of the (b)(1)(A) class, and instead grounded approval of a
(b)(1)(A) damages class on rationales of judicial efficiency and
economy.186 These appellate decisions directly conflict with federal
class action jurisprudence, which does not read the language "in-
consistent or varying adjudications" to authorize class certifica-
tion under 23(b)(1)(A) in any action where individual lawsuits
might have different outcomes. Nor does federal class action ju-
risprudence ground the (b)(1)(A) class category in reasons of judi-
cial efficiency and economy."'
In addition, there are serious constitutional constraints that
render class certification of damage class actions under 42(b)(1)(A)
inappropriate. These include the lack of necessary cohesion
among class members, the Shutts problem, res judicata effects,
and the inability to solve these problems through use of an opt-
out provision.
As indicated above, claims brought under federal and state
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class categories contemplate that class mem-
bers' interests are homogeneous; that is, their rights or claims do
not involve individual differences."' For this reason, the manda-
tory classes do not provide for an opt-out exit from the class,
which is considered to be fair. Precisely because all interests
must be shown to be cohesive, there is no need for an opt-out pro-
vision. Therefore, many federal courts have held that Rule
See Wagner & Brown, Ltd v Horwood, 53 SW3d 347 (Tex 2001) (denying petition on
review from grant of class certification under Tex R Civ 42(b)(1)(A), with dissent by Su-
preme Court Justices Hecht, Owen and Abbott, who believe that the Texas Supreme Court
should grant conflicts review to resolve the split among Texas courts concerning the ap-
propriate application of the (b)(1)(A) class).
" See Adams, 791 SW2d at 292-93.
... Moreover, the Adams progeny cases are devoid of any analysis of the nature, scope,
and rationale for the (b)(1)(A) class action.
" See Moore, 5 Moore's Federal Practice, §23.41[21[b] (cited in note 177), which ex-
plains that the presence of individual issues would eliminate the possibility that varying
adjudications in different lawsuits would subject a defendant to incompatible standards of
conduct. This is because if separate lawsuits involve divergent issues, the defendant
should be able to satisfy a judgment in one without violating a different judgment in an-
other.
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23(b)(1)(A) is suitable only for causes of action where no individ-
ual issues exist.
189
The concept of homogeneity for the mandatory 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes is an important analytical concept with practical
implications. Proposed 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions require
cohesiveness precisely because these subdivisions do not include
the due process protections of notice and the ability to opt out.
Therefore, cohesiveness is necessary as a prerequisite to certify-
ing a mandatory class, and justifies the lack of due process pro-
tections.
As indicated above, federal and state courts have recognized
this important cohesiveness requirement in the medical monitor-
ing context, where plaintiffs have sought certification under the
mandatory 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) provisions. In numerous cases, courts
have held that the presence of individualized facts and issues
among the class members undermines and defeats class certifica-
tion, because of a lack of cohesion among class members.19 ° Re-
cently, the Fifth Circuit recognized the necessity for homogeneity
among class members as a prerequisite for certification of a man-
datory class.' 9' The lack of cohesiveness among class members,
and the presence of individualized issues, contributed to the rea-
sons why the Fifth Circuit reversed certification of a mandatory
class.
The ability to certify mandatory 23(b)(1)(A) damage class ac-
tions in states such as Texas also directly implicates a serious
Shutts problem, where the plaintiff seeks certification of a multi-
state action. The Supreme Court's Shutts decision and subse-
quent jurisprudence relating to the Shutts problem,'92 suggest
that mandatory damage class actions seeking monetary relief
under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) may run afoul of constitutional due
process requirements. Because the Supreme Court has yet to re-
solve this problem, the viability of certifying damage class actions
for monetary relief under the 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) categories is in
serious doubt. Any proposed multistate class action that is certi-
fied as a mandatory class raises the Shutts problem.
" See Doe v Guardian Life Insurance Co, 145 FRD 466, 477 (N D I1 1992); Horowitz v
Pownall, 105 FRD 615, 618 (D Md 1985); McHan v Grandbouche, 99 FRD 260, 266 (D Kan
1983).
" See, for example, Barnes v American Tobacco Co, 161 F3d 127, 143, 149 (3d Cir
1998).
"' McManus v Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc, 320 F3d 545, 553 (5th Cir 2003).
.9 See Adams v Robertson, 520 US 83 (1997); Ticor Title Insurance Co v Brown, 511
US 117, 120 (1994); Ticor Title Insurance Co v FTC, 998 F2d 1129 (3d Cir 1993).
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The Shutts problem is further exacerbated in states like
Texas, that permit certification of damage actions under the
23(b)(1)(A) provision and thereby directly implicate a Shutts
problem. Certification of a mandatory Texas multistate class, un-
der the 23(b)(1)(A) provision, would directly implicate both the
chief holding in Shutts as well as footnote 3, because such a class
would be predominantly for damages, without providing for an
opt-out right.
The possibility of certifying mandatory damage class actions
under the 23(b)(1)(A) provision also implicates serious potential
res judicata problems. Under Texas jurisprudence, classes certi-
fied under 42(b)(1)(A) bind all members encompassed by the class
definition. Absent class members encompassed by the class defi-
nition may not opt out of the class. Class members will be bound
by the judgment in the 23(b)(1)(A) class. Under res judicata prin-
ciples, this judgment will bar class members from pursuing all
claims that could have, or should have, been raised in the action,
including consequential damages.
And, while Texas Rule 42(d) parallels the same Federal Rule
23(d) provision that authorizes the judge to issue various orders
relating to the supervision and management of class actions, fed-
eral courts have indicated that courts may not solve problems of
the mandatory 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes simply by providing
an opt-out provision. To provide an opt-out opportunity for the
mandatory classes completely subverts and defeats the concepts
underlying the mandatory class categories.
E. Opt-Out Claimants as Hostage Pawns
As these four different illustrations suggest, the practical
realities of class action litigation are often far removed from the
abstract theories and concepts undergirding a carefully crafted
class action rule. In the practical world of class action litigation,
attorneys and the courts pay a kind of ritual, winking obeisance
to the forms of the class categories, without implementing any
meaningful distinctions among them. Pleading the 23(b) class
categories, and supporting those categories at certification, is
tantamount to a procedural jumping-through-the-hoop trick, with
a ringmaster not overly concerned with whether the dog actually
makes it through.
Because I believe that the courts have aided and abetted in
systematic class category drift (at best), and class category blur-
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ring (at worst), I would also suggest that the current state of class
action jurisprudence provides few systemic incentives for any ac-
tors in the system to care about the opt-out situation. Perhaps
even more dire, I would suggest that the system instead has in-
centives to care about opt-outs in ways that have nothing at all to
do with justice and fairness to class claimants.
In this view, the possibility of opt-outs have rendered those
opt-outs the pawns-or hostages-of the class action litigation
system. Whether a class action will be structured to include an
opt-out provision has become a rhetorical negotiating chip among
the varying actors' self-interests. In particular, attorneys care
about opt-outs only in instrumental ways, but not in terms of
achieving justice, fairness, or due process. Nonetheless, both
plaintiffs and class counsel will invoke the rhetoric of justice,
fairness, and due process concerning opt-outs, when to do so is
congruent with the negotiating posture appropriate at any given
moment.
1. Opt-outs as pawns: the plaintiffs'perspective.
Plaintiffs' attorneys have ambivalent views about opt-outs,
because opt-outs are simultaneously bothersome and utilitarian.
Generally, plaintiffs' attorneys would prefer not to pursue
23(b)(3) opt-out classes because of the difficulties in satisfying the
additional predominance and superiority requirements. In the
current judicial climate, the requirement that damage classes be
pursued as 23(b)(3) actions renders the opt-out class a nuisance.
Hence, plaintiffs have been induced to strategically recast com-
plaints under the mandatory 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) provisions,
which do not require the additional findings of predominance and
superiority. For class counsel, life is simpler and easier without
the 23(b)(3) requirements and without opt-outs.
Plaintiffs' attorneys also are not enamored of opt-outs in the
litigation context because of the added costs and burdens of no-
tice. And, in both the litigation and settlement contexts, an excess
of actual opt-outs may cause a class settlement to collapse (so-
called exploding provisions). Exploding agreements are exactly.
what their labels say: agreements between defense and class
counsel that a settlement will "explode"--meaning collapse or be
nullified-if x% of class members opt out.
While plaintiffs' attorneys have compelling strategic reasons
for eschewing the 23(b)(3) class category, class counsel nonethe-
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less do have a fine appreciation for the utilitarian deployment of
the opt-out provision as the all-purpose solver of any and all class
problems. Hence, plaintiffs' attorneys like the theory of opt-outs
because it can effectively be used to bail out problematic class
certification efforts. Perhaps the most frequently invoked re-
sponse to judicial queries concerning possible conflicts of interest,
res judicata problems, damages calculations and so on, is the
plaintiff's mantra: "Well, your Honor, they can always opt out."
2. Opt-outs as pawns: the defendants'perspective.
Defendants are equally ambivalent about opt-outs, and simi-
larly view the possibility of opt-outs as both bothersome or possi-
bly useful, depending on the situation. Thus, defendants will ei-
ther deploy or barter the opt-out pawn as the litigation strategy
develops.
Generally, defendants do not like 23(b)(3) opt-out classes be-
cause the certification of a 23(b)(3) class exposes the defendant to
potentially unending litigation. As is well known, what defen-
dants seek most from class action litigation is closure, or "global
peace." Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions do not provide global
peace and opt-outs are a nuisance.
In addition, notwithstanding well-established precedents
mandating that plaintiffs pay the costs for the administration of
notice, in a class action universe riddled with exceptions, defen-
dants frequently wind up paying for the not inconsiderable costs
of notice. In this scenario, opt-outs therefore are an expensive
nuisance. And, precisely parallel to the concerns of plaintiffs, an
excess of actual opt-outs may cause a class settlement to collapse.
On the other hand, the 23(b)(3) opt-out class is advantageous
to the defense because the plaintiffs carry the burden of satisfy-
ing the additional requirements of predominance and superiority.
In essence, pleading a 23(b)(3) damage class provides the defense
with additional factors for defeating class certification. For the
same reasons that defendants may actually find the pleading of a
23(b)(3) opt-out class desirable, plaintiffs prefer the ability to re-
cast the complaint as a mandatory class without additional certi-
fication requirements.
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3. Opt-outs as pawns: convergence of the plaintiffs' and
defense interests.
Whatever high-minded rhetoric plaintiffs' and defense attor-
neys may attach to the virtues of opt-outs, all such principles will
be abandoned when plaintiffs' and defense interests converge on
the utility of the mandatory classes. As long as a class action is
proceeding towards certification of a litigation class, defendants
will steadfastly maintain that damage actions must be certified
under the 23(b)(3) opt-out provision and satisfy the predominance
and superiority requirements. Under these circumstances-and
especially where individualized facts or issues present problems
for class certification-plaintiffs will invoke the 23(b)(3) opt-out
provision as the band-aid for all individualized differences.
However, at the point when plaintiffs and defendants agree
to settle, their interests are likely to converge on settling the dis-
pute by way of a mandatory class with no opt-outs. At this junc-
ture the opt-out pawn, who previously had served useful purposes
to each side as long as the proposed class remained in a litigation
posture, suddenly will be sacrificed to a different set of interests.
The mandatory class ensures global peace for the defendant,
and so the defendant will forego the 23(b)(3) class with an opt-out
right. The mandatory class eliminates the plaintiffs' burdens of
satisfying the additional predominance and superiority require-
ments, and so the plaintiffs will forego the 23(b)(3) class with an
opt-out right. Both plaintiffs and defendants are relieved of the
expense and nuisance of notice. And, both plaintiffs and defen-
dants are relieved of the threat of exploding settlements sabo-
taged by excessive opt-outs.
The mandatory class with no opt-outs is a maximal solution
for both class counsel and defendants, whose converging interests
will merge to accomplish this result at the time of settlement. If a
previously pleaded 23(b)(3) class is converted into a mandatory
23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class for settlement purposes, this decision dis-
favors segments of the putative class who would have preferred,
or perhaps benefited from, the option of an opt-out class. Class
members will be subject to all the limitations, restrictions, and
perils of the mandatory classes, without recourse, and will have
had no say in the strategic decision to reconfigure a 23(b)(3) opt-
out class as a mandatory class.
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4. Opt-outs as pawns: the role of the judiciary.
The judicial system is entrusted with a supervisory role over
class actions, and is empowered to serve as an additional guard-
ian for the interests of absent class members. However, the evo-
lution of class action jurisprudence-particularly the blurring of
class action categories-has made the judiciary complicit in the
"opt-outs as pawns" scenario.
Similar to class counsel and defense attorneys, the judicial
system likes opt-outs in theory. The possibility of the opt-out
class provides the aura or patina of due process and fairness. The
possibility of opt-outs provides the court with a ready-made solu-
tion to any or all problems in a proposed 23(b)(3) class that the
court is inclined to certify.
The possibility of opting-out provides the judicial system with
a cost-free, feel-good solution to permitting class litigation.
Courts rarely, if ever, have to actually deal with opt-outs in an
administrative capacity. Experience and empirical evidence indi-
cates that few, if any, claimants typically opt out of 23(b)(3)
classes, for whatever reasons. Most opt-out claimants do not pur-
sue individual claims; opt-outs simply disappear.
On balance, the judicial system also recognizes the instru-
mental role that opt-outs play in inducing settlement. Just as the
plaintiffs' and defense interests may converge on settlement, so
too will the courts' independent interest in resolving cases on its
docket converge on a settlement solution. Thus, courts independ-
ently recognize that the problems with the 23(b)(3) opt-out class
ironically may be conducive to mandatory class settlements.
When the interests of class counsel, defendants, and the judi-
ciary converge on class settlement, courts will accede to proposals
for mandatory settlements as a docket-clearing device. Or, courts
will permit damage class actions to be certified under the manda-
tory provisions. Or, courts will invent new "hybrid" forms of class
actions to permit the case to be resolved. Whatever previous con-
cerns courts may have had for opt-out claimants, courts will look
the other way with regard to the "no-exit" nature of the manda-
tory class.
Shutts problems will be swept under the rug, although the
court may invoke some due process rhetoric expressing concern
over the implications of the mandatory class. The court may at-
tempt to provide a Shutts band-aid, such as ordering notice (but
no opt-out) for the mandatory class. In the end, the niceties of
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class categories as well as the rationales, purposes, and criteria
for class categories, will be rendered meaningless.
CONCLUSION: WHO CARES ABOUT OPT-OUTS?
One wonders whether the Rule 23(b) class categories have
continuing meaning, vitality, and jurisprudential coherence, and
whether the trend to ignore or blur these categories is a problem
worthy of attention. Certification of a proposed class action pur-
suant to the appropriate class category is singularly important,
because the different class categories implicate different due
process rights. Class actions are representative actions in which a
court has the power to bind absent plaintiffs to a judgment.9 '
Hence, the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action is grounded in im-
portant due process protections for absent class members, and
affords due process protections through the requirement of notice
and the opportunity to exclude oneself from the class."'
The Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are known as mandatory
classes because a judgment is binding on all class members, no
class member may opt out, and notice is not required.9 The lack
of due process protections for 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes is
based on the conceptual foundation that the members have ho-
mogeneous, cohesive interests, and are not pursuing individual
damage claims. Therefore, class certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) foregoes the due process protections of the
23(b)(3) class.
At least one federal appellate court recently has recognized
the nature of these class distinctions and the encroaching prob-
lem of category-creep. On February 14, 2003, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded cer-
tification of a 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) hybrid class action, in which the
plaintiffs had sought certification under the mandatory Rule
23(b)(2) class category, or alternatively under the Rule 23(b)(3)
category.9 The district court had certified the class under both
23(b)(2) and (b)(3).' 97
"' See Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 41-42 (1940); Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472
US 797 (1985).
FRCP 23(b)(3); FRCP 23(c)(2).
See In re Dennis Greenman Securities Litigation, 829 F2d 1539, 1544 (11th Cir
1987).
" McManus v Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc, 320 F3d 545 (5th Cir 2003).
... This class action involved representations that the Fleetwood Company had made
concerning the towing capacity of its motor homes. The plaintiffs brought a class action
alleging violations of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, breach of express war-
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's alternative cer-
tification of the class action under the 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) provi-
sions. The Fifth Circuit repudiated the ability of the plaintiffs to
seek alternative certification under both the mandatory 23(b)(2)
provision and the non-mandatory, opt-out (b)(3) provision.
In criticizing the district court's decision to certify the class
under the mandatory 23(b)(2) provision, the Fifth Circuit indi-
cated:
We emphasize that otherwise inappropriate injunctive re-
lief does not become appropriate for class treatment
merely because the more permissive Rule 23(b)(2), as op-
posed to (b)(3), contemplates injunctive relief. The district
court abused its discretion in allowing the Rule 23(b) clas-
sifications to inform the appropriate remedy, instead of
vice versa.19
In addition, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the district
court's decision to certify a mandatory 23(b)(2) class where the
appropriate remedy was monetary damages, undermined the
fundamental scheme of the class action rule:
Moreover, permitting this lawsuit to continue as a Rule
23(b)(2) class would undo the careful interplay between
Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). That is, the class members would
potentially receive a poor substitute for individualized
money damages, without the corresponding notice and
opt-out benefits of Rule 23(b)(3); and defendants would po-
tentially be forced to pay what is effectively money dam-
ages, without the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to meet the
rigorous Rule 23(b)(3) requirements.'99
The Fifth Circuit's decision is unusual in considering the
structure of the pleading of the class claims and relief, and for
paying analytical attention to the distinctions among class cate-
gories. As I have attempted to demonstrate, most courts do not
pay such heed, but rather have embarked on an evolutionary
path of eliminating distinctions among class categories.
ranty, breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent conceal-
ment. Id.
McManus, 320 F3d at 554.
' Id.
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In the end, who needs to worry about opt-outs or opt-ins
when the class categories have become hopelessly blurred and
have little analytical or conceptual content? The class categories
have been rendered virtually meaningless by the courts, and con-
sequently the class action rule is internally incoherent. Against
this jurisprudential backdrop, attorneys skillfully exploit the
blurring of class category distinctions that courts have engen-
dered and supported. The lack of analytical coherence has, in
turn, fostered clever strategic gaming of the system. The Su-
preme Court has not brought order to this universe, and the Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules as well as the Judicial Confer-
ence have essentially defaulted on the problem.
Even more troubling, the possibility of opt-outs in the
23(b)(3) class have rendered opt-out claimants as fungible hos-
tages and pawns in the class action game. Notwithstanding all
the laudatory due process rhetoric surrounding the desirability of
opt-outs, class counsel, defense attorneys, and the courts have
proven themselves perfectly willing to abandon opt-outs in the
interests of settlement. If mandatory classes with no exit are in
tension with the due process rhetoric of the 23(b)(3) class, then
mandatory damage class actions are antithetical to notions of
collective justice.
The judicial system has been complicit in blithely permitting
attorneys to repetitively amend and re-plead class complaints,
endorsing changes in the form of the class categories and class-
wide relief. Courts have been complicit in permitting attorneys to
convert 23(b)(3) actions in (b)(1) or (b)(2) actions, or (b)(2) actions
into (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) hybrid concoctions.
Who wins under this system? Plaintiffs' attorneys win be-
cause they settle actions, in many cases accomplish nominal re-
sults for the mandatory class, and are awarded fees for their ef-
forts. There is no incentive for plaintiffs to care about opt-outs.
Defense attorneys and their clients win: they accomplish global
peace without undue added expense and nuisance. There is no
incentive for defendants to care about opt-outs. The judicial sys-
tem wins because the case goes away by agreement of counsel.
There is no incentive for the judicial system to care about opt-
outs.
Who loses under this system? Class claimants lose because
they have no effective voice in the decision to plead or re-plead a
class complaint strategically for purposes that may not be in the
best interests of the claimants. And, those who still care about
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myopic proceduralism, judicial integrity, and principled analysis
also lose in the end.
